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Abstract
This thesis concerns the co-constitution of extractivism and claims to authority, particularly
in contexts where the legal narrative hides the ways that extractivism is facilitated. I examine
how law implicitly structures extractivism, as well as how states use extractivism to generate
authority. I look at this relationship in the context of international legal debates over the
Antarctic Treaty, and a history of extractive interventions by the settler colonial state towards
the Murray-Darling River Basin in south-eastern Australia. The way I read claims to
authority engages both the violence and instability of these claims. The specific ways in
which the relationship between extractivism and authority is enacted in these contexts
depends in part on the spatial construction of water and ice. The co-constitution of
extractivism and authority in these examples is also revealed both through imperial
imaginaries that have material effects, and material practices that build a colonial legal
imaginary.
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Introduction
The questions of this thesis concern the co-constitution of extractivism and claims to
authority. In it, I examine the relationship between legal ordering and extractivism in contexts
where the relevant legal narrative hides or denies that extractivism is being facilitated. I
examine how law implicitly structures extractivism, as well as how states use extractivism to
generate authority. The first concern of the thesis is how forms of law structure and facilitate
extractivism in sites where extraction is posited as contained, rather than explicitly
authorized. The specific forms of law that I examine are international law and the law of a
settler colonial state, and the sites are Antarctica and a river system in south-eastern
Australia, the Murray-Darling Basin. Mining is banned in Antarctica, a ban that has material
impact in preventing extraction on the Antarctic continent.1 This is of course significant, as
warming Antarctic ice already exposes and contributes to substantial global climate change
without extractive disruption.2 Yet what can at times be assumed is that the Antarctic Treaty
System is, in a more essentialized way, an anti-extractive legal instrument.3 Returning to a
point of contest over the Treaty System, a set of debates at the General Assembly in late
1984,4 I argue that while the Treaty System eventuates in a mining ban over Antarctic
territory,5 it contributes to global extractivism beyond Antarctica through reinforcing imperial
geographies and temporalities that international law produces. I read the Treaty System in
this way through examining debates over mining and the distribution of authority over the
continent. I suggest that these debates expose the global structuring work that international
law generally, and the Antarctic Treaty System specifically, enact, in a way that would be
less visible by focusing on the doctrinal change of the mining ban that came into effect after
these debates. This is because what was at stake in these debates, beyond mining regulation,
was the contested (il)legitimacy of the doctrine of discovery and distinct (redistributive or

1

See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Madrid, 4 October 1991, 30 ILM 1461
(entered into force 14 January 1998), cited in Kees Bastmeijer, “Introduction: The Madrid Protocol 1998–2018.
The need to address ‘the Success Syndrome’” (2018) 8:2 The Polar Journal 230 at 230.
2
See Jonathan Watts, 'Antarctic temperature rises above 20C for first time on record,' The Guardian (14
February 2020) online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/13/antarctic-temperature-rises-above20c-first-time-record>.
3
See for example praise for the Treaty System in the introductory comments to Gillian D Triggs & Anna
Riddell, Antarctica: legal and environmental challenges for the future (London: British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, 2007).
4
See UNGA, 39th Sess. UN Doc A/39/583, Study requested under General Assembly resolution 38/77. Part II,
Volume I-III, (29 October – 9 November 1984), New York.
5
See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1.
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imperial) spatial imaginaries invoked by the principle of the common heritage of mankind.
The narrative of linear progress was contested through debates over the legitimacy of the
doctrine of discovery as a way to claim sovereignty, which multiple states use as the basis for
the authority to govern Antarctica.6 Spatial imaginaries were also contested through the
discourse of the common heritage of mankind. States who formed part of the Non-Aligned
Movement, in these debates, emphasized the redistributive potential of the imaginary of a
common heritage of mankind.7 Certain signatory states to the Treaty System sought to
appropriate the discourse to reinforce an imperial geographic imaginary that, I argue,
continues to contribute to forms of global extractivism through reinforcing an imperial
legality. Focusing on the Treaty System’s localized effects cannot fully appreciate the work it
does to contribute to reinforcing international law as a mechanism that locates the power to
decide, extract and profit in the global North.
The Murray-Darling Basin river system exhibits signs of centuries of extractivism including
dry riverbeds, salinity, algae, burning marshes and dying fish.8 In response, much of the more
recent discourse of the Australian state centres on reducing extraction, or rendering it
sustainable.9 Looking at a longer history of colonial extractive interventions towards this
river system, I argue that the techniques of metering and dividing water that are currently
implemented to reduce extraction are largely continuous with the techniques that positioned
the river system as an extractive site to begin with, due to their commodification and
exchange of water.
My second concern in the thesis is how states use these forms of law and their relationship to
extractivism to generate, stabilize or project authority. In the Murray-Darling, the forms of
extractive intervention mirror dynamics of settler colonial claims to authority in both their
violence and instability.10 Reasserting control over the river system does more than position it
6

See for example submissions of Australia (views of states, submission 3) in UNGA, supra note 4.
See for example submissions of Pakistan, (view of states, submission 33) in UNGA, supra note 4.
8
See Jessie Davies, ‘"It’s very grim": Macquarie Marshes wetland on fire and massive flush the only way to
save it,' ABC News (28 October 2019), online: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-28/macquarie-marsheson-fire-90pc-reed-bed-razed/11645914>.; Anne Davies, 'Hundreds of thousands of native fish dead in second
Murray-Darling incident,' The Guardian (7 January 2019), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2019/jan/07/hundreds-of-thousands-of-native-fish-dead-in-second-murray-darling-incident>; Margaret
Simons, “Cry Me a River: The Tragedy of the Murray-Darling Basin,” Quarterly Essay 77 (March 2020).
9
See for example discourses of a sustainable diversion limit discussed in Simons, supra note 8 at 4; 6-7.
10
See on these dynamics in forms of state law, Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (London:
Routledge, 1992); and see for settler colonial contexts specifically Shiri Pasternak & Dayna Nadine Scott,
“Introduction: Getting Back the Land” (2020) 119:2 South Atlantic Quarterly 205.
7

2

as an extractive site, it attempts to stabilize an assertion that the law of the colonial state is the
proper, or only, law governing the river system.11 In the Antarctic debates, imperial ‘worldmaking practices’12 are contested and reiterated by different state actors in a way that I
suggest is entangled with, rather than distinct from, the state actors’ claims to authority
beyond Antarctica. Specific signatory states rely on imperial geographies that locate authority
and the profits of extractivism in the North in a more fundamental way than merely a form of
claiming legitimacy over Antarctic governance. Similarly, they rely on a linear temporality
that authorizes discovery as a way to claim territory to legitimize not only their claims to
Antarctica, but also, often, their existence as nation-states.13
The primary way that I investigate the co-constitutive link between extractivism and
authority is through examining how material practices of law and legal imaginaries are each
mobilized to claim authority and legitimize or enact extractivism.14 I focus on how states,
primarily, construct spaces as available for extraction in order to attempt to legitimize their
authority over and beyond that space; how authority over contested space is claimed and
reclaimed in relation to extractivism. I primarily focus on state claims to authority in settler
colonial or imperial structures because of their specific relation to extractivism, and because
of the form of my legal training. My focus on both the instability and violence of imperial
and settler colonial claims to legal authority and totality, and their relationship to
extractivism, is due to both my position as a white Australian settler scholar as well as my
legal training in the Anglo-Australian common law, which is inextricability linked to
dispossession, settler colonialism and British Empire.15 I do not focus on state discourse in
order to equate the state form with law itself. There are multiple legal actors, forms of law
and legal orders that compete and overlap with the state claims I examine.16 I also read state

11

See on the impossible assertion of a unitary, totalizing law asserted through material practices, Olivia Barr, A
Jurisprudence of Movement: Common Law, Walking, Unsettling Place (Abingdon; Routledge, 2016).
12
See on world-making practices Matthew Craven, Sundhya Pahuja & Gerry Simpson, “Reading and Unreading
a Historiography of Hiatus” in Matthew Craven, Sundhya Pahuja & Gerry Simpson, eds, International Law and
the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) 1 at 23.
13
The doctrine of discovery relies on more than a linear temporality of course, including the violence of
racialized discourses of civilization and terra nullius. See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty, and the
making of international law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Ntina Tzouvala,
“Civilisation” in Jean d’Aspremont & Sahib Singh, Concepts for international law: contributions to disciplinary
thought (Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) 83.
14
Indeed the impact of imperial imaginaries on reproducing material extraction is one crucial reason why I pay
attention to these imaginaries.
15
See for example on the common law’s relationship to Empire, Olivia Barr, “Walking with empire” (2013) 38
Australian Feminist Law Journal 59.
16
Significantly for the Murray-Darling region, First Nations’ law.
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discourse as not determinative of a total legality, and resistance projects as articulations of
legal orders outside the epistemic frameworks of state law.17 I am focusing on state discourse
to unravel it to some extent, but there is also significant resistance at work that has its own
specific juridicity, and cannot be obscured if we are to take the liquidity or instability of legal
ordering seriously.18 Resistance is central to the stories that I tell here, and significantly
influences state claims, discourse and practices of extractivism.19 I speak less about resistance
in this thesis so as to not claim to know, in any complete sense, about the demands of
particular forms of resistance. In the last chapter I briefly look at the resistive possibilities
inherent in unstable and incomplete claims to lawful authority, in order to point to a
significant multiplicity of challenges to the extractivism-authority relationship and its legal
ordering. In doing so, it is important to also acknowledge the significant resistance to explicit
forms of violent extractivism, even as this thesis primarily examines the implicit
authorization of extractivism.20 I take the state as an actor in order to somewhat unravel its
claims to singularity, and not to accept the terms it sets out or conflate multiple parts of state
operations.21 I also do not focus on state discourse to deny the influence of the corporation or
capital – corporations are not present in all the stories told in this thesis, but overall play a
significant role in legitimizing as well as competing with state authority in spaces denoted as
available for extraction.22 Indeed, it is not possible to fully understand the settler state’s
extractivism without an account of its relationship with capital.23 If I use an example of a
single state, I primarily look at the Australian state, having lived nearly all my life on lands
that it claims. Although I also wrote this thesis in lands claimed by the Canadian state, and
my work is animated by the rich discussion and practices of resisting extractivism and settler
colonialism that I encountered there also.24
17

See generally Kathleen Birrell, Indigeneity: before and beyond the law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).
Ibid, particularly Chapter 3 on both the juridicity of law outside the state, and on the unstable dynamic of state
law.
19
See Shiri Pasternak, Grounded authority: the Algonquins of Barriere Lake against the state (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2017).
20
See as examples Ibid; and contributions to the special issue introduced by Pasternak and Scott, supra note 10.
21
See generally on the problems of doing so, due to complex interactions between international and local space
production and a ‘shifting global order,’ Luis Eslava, Local space, global life: the everyday operation of
international law and development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 8. See also Luis Eslava,
& Sundhya Pahuja. “The State and International Law: A Reading from the Global South” (2020) 11:1 Humanity
118.
22
See Sundhya Pahuja, “Public Debt, the Peace of Utrecht, and the Rivalry between Company and State” in
Alfred Soons, ed, The 1713 Peace of Utrecht and Its Enduring Effects (Netherlands: Brill, 2016) 156.
23
See Dayna Nadine Scott, ‘Extraction Contracting: The Struggle for Control of Indigenous Lands’ (2020)
119:2 South Atlantic Quarterly 269.
24
See for example all contributions to Pasternak and Scott, supra note 10. See also Zoe Todd, “Refracting the
State Through Human-Fish Relations: Fishing, Indigenous Legal Orders and Colonialism in North/Western
Canada” (2018) 7:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 60.
18

4

Extractivism is a particular form of resource extraction that is involved with capital
accumulation and dispossessive social processes, which Dayna Scott characterizes as a
relation, ‘a particular way of relating to nature.’25 Extractivism is enacted in a variety of
ways, including through violent means, and legitimated through various techniques including
discourses of development and the mobility and legal status of the corporate form.26 In the
context of global extractivism, I came to the concerns of this thesis through an interest in
whether discourses on restraining extraction sufficiently depart from the sustaining dynamics
of extractivism and its relationship with authority. I came to understand that while an
extractivist positioning of resources takes them as separate from land, extractivism in these
examples is inherently connected to the contested authority over territory.27 The question I
take up here is what structuring work does international law, or the law of a settler colonial
state, do to facilitate extractivism, and in particular, when extractive projects are not in full
view? The assumptions that I started with included the co-constitution of international law
and the law of a settler state,28 the highly connected relationship between the settler state and
corporate authority,29 and how technologies of investment or development projects enabling
extractivism were as much about authority and maintaining a deeply unequal global order as
about the extractive project in question.30 The question that I came to was how can we
understand the effects produced, and technologies utilized, by legal discourse that purports to
limit extraction in relation to global extractivism? If doctrinal changes or policy measures to
reduce extraction do not confront the sustaining dynamic of the co-constitution between
extractivism and (certain imperial and colonialist) forms of authority, then would they
perpetuate this relationship, with devastating consequences?

25

See Dayna Nadine Scott, “Extractivism” in Mariana Valverde, Kamari Clarke, Eve Darian-Smith & Prabha
Kotiswaran, eds, Handbook of Law and Society (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming 2021). Emphasis original.
26
See Sundhya Pahuja, “Corporations, Universalism and the Domestication of Race in International Law” in
Duncan Bell, ed, Empire, Race and Global Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) 74.
27
Although this may be very different in distinct colonial forms, this thesis primarily focuses on the multiple
forms of authority with connections to settler colonial territoriality. See Scott, supra note 23; Scott, supra note
25.
28
Including the simultaneous reproduction of a settler state’s imperial and colonial positions. See Antony
Anghie, “Race, self-determination and Australian empire” (2018) 19:2 Melbourne Journal of International Law
423; Cait Storr, “‘Imperium in Imperio’: Sub-Imperialism and the Formation of Australia as a Subject of
International Law” (2018) 19:1 Melbourne Journal of International Law 335.
29
Pahuja supra note 26; Scott, supra note 23.
30
See Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising international law: development, economic growth, and the politics of
universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Anghie, supra note 13.

5

In this thesis, therefore, I primarily pay attention to the margins of extractive discourse, the
ways of ordering that are maintained when the explicit narrative is about conserving and
regulating mining resources, or saving water and regulating irrigation.31 I look at sites where
considerations of extractivism are generally framed in terms of limiting or prohibiting
extraction, but where returning to a specific historic moment can help to draw out the ways
that extractivism is at the same time still authorized through techniques of governing or
regulating extractivism that also authorize its continuance. In the Antarctic context, the
maintenance of forms of authority that rely on imperial geographies and reinforce global
extractivism perpetuates global ordering that seeks to enable the global North to continue
profiting from Southern resources. Revisiting a specific set of debates at the United Nations
over the Antarctic Treaty, which were a moment in which the distribution of authority and
the use of resources were contested, allows us to see the ways in which imperial geographies
may continue to be legitimized despite a mining ban over the Antarctic continent. In the
Murray Darling, the discourse of saving, reducing or redirecting extraction is incomplete and
jarring when the interventions maintain an extractive positioning of water as exchangeable.
Examining techniques of moving water is also a way to trace the placing of colonial law
(intended to be) at the centre of controlling these rivers.32 Although these two instances are
distinct in important ways from more explicitly violent forms of extractivism,33 I argue that
they are not entirely separate from such violence. There is, I suggest, an underlying substrate
in particular forms of legal ordering that legitimizes and reproduces extractivism, even, or in
some cases especially, where extractivism is ostensibly contained, regulated or prohibited. In
this way, my account of techniques of extractivism involves not only (but no less
significantly so) violent theft, development, labour exploitation or investment.34 Techniques
of extractivism are also embedded in international or the colonial state law’s world-making
dimensions,35 which I will argue rely on linear temporality, imperial geographies, and
techniques of commodification including division and exchange in ways that are
fundamentally extractive. What is also at stake in these techniques is a co-constitutive effect,
techniques that authorize and structure extractivism, but also generate (contingent and
unstable) claims to authority by doing so. In this way the thesis is also about what authority
31

As is the case in the two examples I examine.
See Barr, supra note 11.
33
See Tendayi Achiume, Global Extractivism and Racial Inequality: Report of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, UN Doc
A/HRC/41/54 (14 May 2019), Human Rights Council, 41st session, 24 June – 12 July 2019, Agenda Item 9.
34
See Ibid; see also on the justifications of the development project and investment Pahuja, supra note 30.
35
Craven, Pahuja & Simpson, supra note 12 at 23.
32
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state or international law generates through extractivism. This dual inquiry opens a broader
conception of extractivism as well as a broader consideration of possibilities for resistance
that challenge law’s more marginal ordering, beyond doctrinal changes.
In the two substantive chapters, I look at specific techniques of extractivism utilized by state
actors. In the chapter on Antarctica I focus on how the techniques of space-making and linear
temporalities contribute to framing the authority-extractivism relationship. In the chapter on
the Murray-Darling Basin waters I focus on the technique of movement – literally,
interventions to move and divert water, as well as changing projections of how exactly the
water is framed as extractible and governed by state law.36 In this way, movement as a
technology is not a descriptive phrase but reveals an insidious practice that builds a
pervasive, if unstable, colonial legality.37 In each chapter I look at the forms of authority
generated through these techniques. The techniques are, for Antarctica, a linear temporality
which appears in debates on the doctrine of discovery, and an imperial geography contested
through debates on the discourse of the common heritage of mankind. In the Murray-Darling,
the techniques are a commodification through division and exchange. The forms of authority
generated through these techniques are, for Antarctica, legitimizing sovereignty through
discovery, and legitimizing a global ordering that privileges Northern decision-making and
profit.38 In the Murray-Darling, the forms of authority are the settler state’s authority, which
unravels and is continually reasserted.39
Because I want to examine the relationship to authority, including territorial authority,
generated and enacted by extractivism, it is significant that the spaces I examine occur are
constructed as not completely solid land.40 The colonial legal imaginary and its relationship
to land, authority and territory is specific.41 Antarctica is viewed as a space of remote ice,42 a

36

See on movement as a technique Barr, supra note 11.
Ibid.
38
On the continuous impact of the doctrine of discovery in international legal ordering see Anghie, supra note
13.
39
See on this negotiation and reassertion Pasternak and Scott, supra note 10.
40
See on the construction of Antarctic ice as ‘not-quite-land’ Barr, supra note 11 at 197.
41
See Brenna Bhandar, Colonial lives of property: law, land, and racial regimes of ownership (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2018); Renisa Mawani, Across oceans of law: the Komagata Maru and jurisdiction in the time
of empire (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Cait Storr, ‘Denaturalising the Concept of Territory in
International Law,’ in Julia Dehm & Usha Natarajan, eds, Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), via Academia:
https://www.academia.edu/42663319/Denaturalising_the_Concept_of_Territory_in_International_Law.
42
Barr, supra note 11 at 197.
37
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form of ‘outside’ space.43 The rivers of the Murray-Darling are viewed as a moveable, liquid
resource.44 These constructions mean that the way these sites are mobilized by state actors to
contribute to the authority-extractivism relationship is specific. Much has been written about
how claiming space, territory or land with legal techniques (and the violence this entails) is
incomplete and unstable; overlapping narratives must be constantly retold and reformed in
the face of resistance to these claims.45 Spaces constructed as ‘otherwise’ to land or
territory,46 such as outer space or the deep seabed, have been shown to be involved in
constructions of contested authority.47 I am interested in this thesis in how this may also be
the case with rivers and ice for the sites that I examine here. For Antarctica, the construction
of the continent as a confined space, icy and remote, would hide the deep spatial connections
that I read in this thesis to other sites of extractivism that signatory states benefit from. For
the Murray-Darling, the exchange of water is utilized to ‘transform’ land, as is inherent to
colonial projects; the posited moveability of water makes a specific way of extracting it
visible, as well as specific way that this extractivism is related to claiming territory.48 It is for
these two reasons that I speak about laws as liquid, both for the instability and constant
reassertion of claims to authority, as well as for the way they are related to claiming land as
territory or resources in colonial epistemologies.49 The spatial construction of these sites as
remote or liquid is one specific way to see, although there are others, how even though

43

See on spaces constructed as ‘outside’ generally Matthew Craven, “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal
Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space” (2019) 30:2
European Journal of International Law 546.
44
See the state intrusions and exchange detailed in Simons, supra note 8; and Sue Jackson & Lesley Head,
‘Australia’s mass fish kills as a crisis of modern water: Understanding hydrosocial change in the MurrayDarling Basin’ (2020) 109 Geoforum 44.
45
See through the register of film Ruth Buchanan & Rebecca Johnson, “The Unforgiven Sources of
International Law: Nation-building, Violence and Gender in the West(ern)” in Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji,
eds, International Law: Modern Feminist Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 131; see generally
Fitzpatrick, supra note 10.
46
Although these are of course not the same concept. See Storr, supra note 41.
47
See Craven, supra note 43; Surabhi Ranganathan, “Ocean Floor Grab: International Law and the Making of
an Extractive Imaginary” (2019) 30:2 European Journal of International Law 573. See also Cait Storr “‘Space is
the Only Way to Go’: The Evolution of the Extractivist Imaginary of International Law” in Sundhya Pahuja &
Shane Chalmers, eds, Handbook of International Law and the Humanities (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming
2020), via Academia: https://www.academia.edu/42663349/Space_is_the_Only_Way_to_Go_The_
Evolution_of_the_Extractivist_Imaginary_of_International_Law.
48
See Aileen Moreton-Robinson, The White possessive: property, power, and indigenous sovereignty,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Irene Watson, Aboriginal peoples, colonialism and
international law: Raw law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015); see also Anghie, supra note 13; Adrian Smith,
“Toward a Critique of Political Economy of ‘Sociolegality’ in Settler Capitalist Canada” in Mark P. Thomas et
al, eds, Change and Continuity: Canadian Political Economy in the New Millennium (Montreal: McGill
Queen’s University Press, 2019) 167; Tzouvala, supra note 13.
49
See on the colonial constructions of land and water Renisa Mawani, “Law, Settler Colonialism, and the
Forgotten Space of Maritime Worlds” (2016) 12:1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 107; Bhandar,
supra note 41.

8

resources are constructed as removable commodities and disconnected from the land,
extractive processes are, in these examples, deeply connected to ‘struggles for control’ over
land and territory, as Scott has shown.50
There are two primary analytics for how I read authority, narrative and jurisdiction.51 Part of
my inquiry is how material practices of extractivism and imaginaries that reinforce
extractivism work together. This arose from my reading of the debates over resource
extraction in Antarctica, where a later doctrinal change to prohibit material practices of
extraction in Antarctic territory seemed highly entangled with a legal and spatial imaginary
that would implicate the Antarctic Treaty system in legitimizing global practices of material
extraction elsewhere. In turn, it developed through reading histories of dividing and
exchanging commodified water in the Murray-Darling region, where material practices of
extraction contribute to a colonial imaginary of ownership over waters and territory.52 I do
not seek to set up a binary between the registers of the imaginary and the material. I also do
not seek to set up a blurred relationship between the two, they are different in significant
ways. In outlining what I take an imaginary to mean, Sheila Jasanoff’s explanation of sociotechnical imaginaries is helpful.53 I do not adopt a strict definition of a socio-technical
imaginary, yet Jasanoff’s description exposes elements of the kind of influence I read the
proponents of these imaginaries as trying to wield. I take definitions of materiality from both
Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh’s work on jurisdiction that reads techniques of
material practices as building claims to lawful authority,54 and from Adrian Smith’s
explanation of ‘material legality,’55 and its ‘socio-spatial practices,’ and focus on
relationality.56 Using these two frames together assists, for my purposes here, to trouble in
different ways seemingly settled sites where state actors frame extractivism as being
regulated rather than perpetuated. Examining the imperial imaginaries of the Antarctic
debates exposes how the Treaty System reinforces forms of global ordering that have forceful
material consequences. Examining the material techniques of extraction in the Murray-

50

Scott, supra note 23 at 269.
On jurisdiction see Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, Jurisdiction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
52
On the histories of division of water see Simons, supra note 8; on building colonial legal imaginary through
material practices see Barr, supra note 11.
53
See Sheila Jasanoff, “Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity” in Sheila
Jasanoff & Sang-Hyun Kim, eds, Dreamscapes of modernity: sociotechnical imaginaries and the fabrication of
power (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015) 1 at 4.
54
Dorsett and McVeigh, supra note 51.
55
Smith, supra note 48.
56
Ibid.
51
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Darling Basin region exposes how such practices are mobilized to build a colonial legal
imaginary where the law of the settler state is posited as authoritative and all-encompassing.57
In this way, these two frames assist to see how legal ordering both produces and is produced
by extractivism.
Sites
As I have already noted, the two examples that I look at are debates over resource extraction
in Antarctic that occurred in late 1984, and paying attention to the historical context of more
recent struggles over waters of the Murray-Darling. To contextualize the Antarctic debates, it
is necessary to speak a little about the regulation of extraction in the Cold War context.
Certain Cold War practices of relating to scientific inquiry and the natural environment are
relevant to the trajectory of resource discussions in Antarctica. For instance, Aaron Wu traces
particular forms of Cold War thought including the proliferation of ‘similar views about
humanity’s destiny to control and manage its natural environment,’58 and ‘the putative
neutrality of nature.’59 His account focuses on commonality in the context of rivalry between
Cold War powers, which is not to assume that bipolarity is a complete characterization of the
period. Matthew Craven, Sundhya Pahuja and Gerry Simpson write about the period as plural
in terms of spaces, times and perspectives.60 Wu’s characterization of these specific
commonalities between Cold War powers in positing mastery over nature is relevant to
considering the geopolitical landscape that signatory states inhabited and enacted when
debating the Antarctic Treaty. Emily Crawford similarly traces particular forms of Cold War
thought that expose ways of relating to the natural environment as a form of mobilizing
resources. She examines the development of the Environmental Modification (or ENMOD)
Treaty, enacted, as she highlights, ‘to ban environmental modifications a method of
warfare.’61 The sentiment of nature as a strategic resource is also a relevant contextual factor
for reading the debates over governing Antarctica. Whilst the debates in a certain way show
Cold War powers and other signatory states as both defending the Antarctic Treaty system,
faced with re-distributive challenges by states from the Non-Aligned Movement, it is also
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true that I do not examine in equal depth all signatory states to the Antarctic Treaty. This is
partly because of the way my account links claims to authority over Antarctica with other
claims to authority that a state actor makes. Trained as I am in Anglo-Australian common
law, I attend first to legal projections related to British imperialism and related forms of
settler colonialism.62 Yet there are a number of untold stories of signatory states, participating
states and contesting states (as well as all those actors, technologies and projects not
confineable to the state form).63 Additionally, by focusing on these actors as a way to attend
to my legal training, I do not seek to de-emphasize the multiple legalities of Non-Aligned
state actors or to collapse these in a homogenized ‘other’ position, but to take seriously
contests at play.64 The way resources are linked to authority, spatial imaginaries to material
practices and impacts, and the way that this plays out through a discussion over resources
where authority is implicated and contested is why I chose these debates specifically.65 I take
up the assertions of states whose law is linked to British Empire partly to attend to the
interplay between the national and international, as the national context of my second
example is Australia.66 Partially also, then the domestic context provided by the MurrayDarling history (although they are not strictly contemporaneous) is a helpful backdrop to
assertions made internationally. Certainly my account is not a complete account of either of
these histories, even of the totality of the debates or narratives themselves. Reading the two
sites together helps expose the continuation and interaction of specific extractive dynamics
and techniques.
To contextualize interventions in the Murray-Darling, a necessary backdrop is the centrality
of settler colonial extractive projects to claims of authority made by Australia, as First
Nations scholars such as Irene Watson and Aileen Moreton-Robinson have shown.67 Watson
shows extractive projects including fracking and mining in Australia are intrinsically related
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to state claims that state law is valid to the exclusion of First Nations’ law.68 A historical
reading of interventions in the Murray-Darling can help bring into focus the different ways
racialized possession, as Moreton-Robinson highlights, is claimed by moving and attempting
to control river flows.69 The names of these waterways, used by settler governments, are of
course partial and colonially entangled. I maintain them for the purposes of tracing state
interventions, but there are other names by which these rivers are known.70
I must also attend to environmental concerns, as Antarctica is now a site of significant glacial
melting.71 Also in the acknowledgement that catastrophic climatic effects are experienced
disproportionality in the global South, I certainly do not dismiss the importance of mining
and nuclear waste disposal bans restraining corporate intrusions.72 I pay attention to the
relations and cartography that are maintained whilst the ban is implemented, which I argue is
not separable from extractivism that continues and increases elsewhere.73 There has also been
relatively recent rain near the Murray-Darling Basin, but the temporary easing of signals such
as burning marshes or dry riverbeds should not be taken to mean that structure of extractive
interventions or their legal relationships and ordering have fundamentally changed.74
This is not a history of global or colonial extractivism.75 Both of these examples are about
what happens to authority and its relationship to extractivism when it is claimed that
extraction is not occurring or is reduced: in one instance, a (long-term but not permanent)
mining ban, and another a discourse of saving and returning water to rivers it has long been
taken from. The sites were chosen both for their relation to a discourse of restraining
extraction, and for being spatially constructed as not entirely the solid land of the settler
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state’s imaginary of static territorial authority.76 Antarctica provides an example of the
complex spatiality of the authority-extractivism relationship, and the Murray-Darling how the
idea of a resource can be isolated, on the verge of disappearing or being used up, but still be
mobilized as a way to maintain territorial authority.77 These examples help to expose the
ways in which, despite resources being posited as separable, extractivism is deeply connected
to contests over land.78

Position
Locating myself, to the materials as well as within bodies of work, requires discussing ways
which I might arrive at being able to speak with this material, positioned and trained as I am
in the forms of law and their epistemologies that I seek to unsettle. Anghie outlines
methodological challenges with investigating stories of imperialism and colonialism,79
including the need to locate ‘concepts and lenses’ that are ‘adequate for this purpose.’80 The
frames that I adopt, examining narrative and jurisdiction, seek to destabilize the singularity
and totality of claims to law and authority by state actors in international and national
contexts.81 Anghie concludes that the purpose of his account of Australia as Empire is that
‘the unique character of Australia’s relationship with imperialism can only be understood if
different and yet connected forms of imperialism … are considered together as opposed to
separately.’82 Kathleen Birrell also discusses possibilities of disembeddedness, complicity, or
the reproduction of a discursive dynamic that silences the other and recreates a position of
power to speak from.83 On this point, she notes Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s observation
that ‘the coloniser himself is constructed in relation to the colony.’84 Yet Birrell traces a
tentative path for a settler scholar embarking on a conversation about systems of state law
that they benefit from. She proposes a continuous approach,85 and one that foregrounds
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relationality, a ‘more open-ended view of discourse and communication,’86 where it is
possible to attempt to translate ‘between one hermeneutic moment and another,’87 without
seeking to ‘‘know,’’88 if ‘knowledge implies domination.’89 Following these insights, framing
the project as an inquiry into law’s role in facilitating extractivism, I seek to engage both the
instability and violence of imperial and colonial legal projections, and certainly not to
produce knowledge about a site in a way that reproduces a centre-periphery dynamic about
where knowledge is produced. I here attempt to locate myself in a similar manner to Birrell,
who I read as seeking not only a position, but to direct her work towards creating a space
with potential for plurality and attentiveness to existing resistive possibilities.90
This thesis attends to how international or state law are implicated in the sustaining dynamics
of extractivism, and relatedly racial capitalism and the violence and instability of specific
claims to authority.91 I investigate these questions through looking at a set of debates on the
Antarctic Treaty and at the Murray-Darling river system, specifically through the frames of
the imaginary and the material and the analytics of jurisdiction and narrative, to which I now
turn.
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Chapter 1 – Extractivism: Locations and Methods
This chapter sets out how I locate myself within multiple bodies of literature that understand
extractivism as deeply linked to racial capitalism, imperialism and settler colonialism.
Understanding both the violent and unstable nature of claims to authority, and their
relationship to extractivism, I engage the work of jurisdiction in order to expose contested
practices of asserting legal authority,92 as well as work on legal narratives. The work that
narrative does for me in this thesis is to understand the connection between how a story of
law becomes authoritative, which is contested in a different way to practices of jurisdiction.
If this thesis concerns the relationship between authority and extractivism, both what
authority is claimed from extractivism as well asserted through it, then this chapter develops
an account of each of those parts of the relationship, which will be drawn out further in the
two substantive chapters. The methods that I use to do so are an attention to histories, and
engaging technologies: specifically, the work of techniques of space-making that rely on
imperial imaginaries and a linear, homogenous temporality, and techniques of control and
asserting ownership through movement, commodification and division.

Part 1: Locations
There are many ways to understand the relationship between extractivism and claims to
authority. This section outlines the ways that I locate my work within this relationship, where
extractivism is deeply linked to coloniality, racialization and capital.
Extractivism
Resource extraction can be done on many scales and in many ways. Extractivism, in contrast,
necessarily involves particular social processes linked to capitalism, state and corporate
power, and certain forms of dispossession, to varying degrees.93 Dayna Scott defines
extractivism as
‘not an activity, but a relation.… a mode of accumulation in which a high pace and scale
of ‘taking’ generates benefits for distant capital without generating benefits for local
people. It is a way of relating to lands and waters that is non-reciprocal and oriented to

92
93

Dorsett and McVeigh, supra note 45.
See Scott, supra note 25.

15

the short-term. Extractivism refers to a particular logic endemic to and intensifying under
contemporary global capitalism, but also with a very long history.’94

Facundo Martín writes about extractivism as ‘an expression of political dominance.’95 He
highlights its ‘relational, omnipresent and temporal’ dimensions,96 arguing that the nature of
extractivism (and its uneven distributive effects) is complex and widespread. He engages
work that points to extractive accumulation, degradation and ‘financialisation,’97 compelling
citing Maristella Svampa’s definition of a ‘political-economic-narrative consensus.’98 He
goes on to argue, however, that the dynamics of extractivism cannot be adequately accounted
for without conceptualizing extractivism spatially, as produced by a certain global geopolitics
rather than an analysis bounded by the nation-state.99 Extractivism is not a static practice
through time, and there is also rich work on the changing dynamics of neo-extractivism.100 I
maintain the use of the term extractivism to signal forms of historical continuity, without
denying the changes in extractive practices.101
If Scott uses the ‘underlying political economy’ and the relations engendered by it as the
primary analytic to account for extractivism,102 writing that ‘the dynamics of extraction are
shaped by the reality that the ‘taking’ by necessity must happen in the specific places where
the resources are found,’103 and Martín its spatiality and productive dimensions (all of which
are relevant for my purposes), Macarena Gómez-Barris invokes an ‘extractive view’ that
necessarily precedes extractive projects.104 She argues that, ‘before the colonial project could
prosper, it had to render territories and peoples extractible and it did so through a matrix of
symbolic, physical, and representational violence.’105 This violence involved social ordering
as well as claims to territory and resources, and Gómez-Barris describes coloniality and
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capital as inseparable in constituting extractivism.106 She calls attention to erasure and
techniques of rendering invisible inherent in the extractive view, particularly with links to
false proclamations of terra nullius.107 Scott also points to ‘fierce resistance’ to extractivism,
which ‘exposes deep rifts’ between ‘principles of deep relationality’ and ‘extractive
logics.’108 Gómez-Barris’ primary concern is artistic resistance projects that enable
contestation of extractivism. In attending to those points of rupture, she notes, ‘like any
system of domination, extractive capitalism is not totalizing in its destructive effects.’109 Yet
it is also necessary here to account for the overwhelming violence of extractivism,
highlighted in the recent report by Tendayi Achiume, Global Extractivism and Racial
Equality.110 Achiume reports on the violence of global forms of extractivism, practices of
colonial dispossession, slavery, racialized exploitation of labour,111 and continuing patterns of
power distribution.112 She writes about the transnationality of extractivism, ‘not only did
colonial extractivism plunder colonial territories and racially stratify labour globally, but it
also forced territories of extraction into political and economic subordination to colonial
nations.’113 Achiume also calls attention to the centrality of both the corporate form and
international law in structuring extractive processes.114 Following these insights, it is not
possible for my purposes to think about extractivism in the absence of racial capitalism,
imperialism or settler colonialism, or the overlapping authorities of corporations and states.115
I engage work on these concerns as they relate to extractivism here.
Anghie has also traced links between extractivism and imperialism and notably reports that
an agreement over the administration of Nauru as a League of Nations Mandate territory
included provision for all states involved not to intervene in any aspect of phosphate
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mining.116 Anghie exposes the significance of phosphate extraction to Australian imperialism
towards Nauru and for the Australian state’s development of characteristics of an imperial as
well as a settler colonial nation, partly through reliance on international law.117 As he
demonstrates, discourses of racism were further mobilized to enable extractivism.118 Cait
Storr also examines racialization and the simultaneous reproduction of imperial extraction
and settler colonialism (in the case of Australia), showing racialized ‘supremacist
anxieties’119 influenced both domestic and international assertions of authority.120 Pahuja
draws from Frantz Fanon’s work to write about racialization in relation to economic
distribution, yet the same could be said for relations of extractivism. Pahuja highlights, ‘for
Fanon, the question of economic inequality can be separated neither from history in general,
and the history of colonialism in particular, nor from the question of race.’121 Pahuja points to
the co-constitution of these, because ‘race was – and remains – an operative (historical)
category in the constitution of the ‘human.’’122 Pahuja, writing about distinctions between
Fanon and Thomas Pogge’s accounts of international economic distribution, both calls
attention to the way race constitutes the development project, and also how it is made
invisible as an analytic, ‘as a concern of the national sphere,’123 which produces a positioning
of race as ‘no longer understood to be a global practice of ordering.’124 Christopher Gevers,
in examining the imaginaries of Pan-African literature and projects to ‘radically re-imagine,
and then re-write ‘the global,’’125 draws from Pahuja’s work to show how the nation-station
creates forms restricting the legibility for discussing race and the international. Yet, he says,
‘race was a, if not the, constitutive feature of the global order.’126
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Shiri Pasternak, in an examination of Canadian settler colonial extractivist techniques for a
special issue entitled Getting Back the Land, writes about the co-production of racial
capitalism and settler colonialism.127 She uses Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s explanation of racial
capitalism: ‘a technology for reducing collective life to the relations that sustain neoliberal
democratic capitalism.’128 Moreton-Robinsons also explains this co-constitution in relation to
colonial Australia, that ‘Cook’s idea of possession was informed by the logic of capital.’129
The racialized violence of settler colonial state law or claims to authority and extractivism are
operative in an continuous way.130 Moreton-Robinson writes of reasserting claims to white
possession in a settler colony ‘it takes a great deal of work… ;'131 and settler states, she
highlights, ‘are extremely busy reaffirming and reproducing this possessiveness through a
process of perpetual Indigenous dispossession.’132 Yet the authority claimed in settler
colonial extractivism is necessarily embedded in theft and ongoing territorial dispossession, it
cannot be explained merely as a disembedded or dematerialized projection. Pasternak writes,
drawing on Jodi Byrd’s seminal work, that ‘settler colonialism is not just a form of racialized
violence, but a form of domination that is itself constituted by the materiality of land theft
and genocide.’133 Brenna Bhandar also draws on Byrd’s work, highlighting that ‘the
conflation of racialization and colonization works to erase the central function played by
territoriality in colonization and contemporary modes of dispossession.’134 In doing so she
also draws from Stuart Hall’s work to argue that the ‘uneven, nonlinear, and sometimes
contradictory effects’ of these cannot be guaranteed, at least not in any particular form.135 She
writes that ‘the continual renewal of racial regimes of ownership is not an inevitability, as
political imaginaries that exceed the confines of this juridical formation demonstrate.’136
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Attending to the what Byrd calls the ‘territoriality of conquest,’137 the way stolen land is
necessarily central to forms of racial capitalism and extractivism in a settler colony, does not
necessarily require adopting the concept of territory as it is defined by international law. Storr
has exposed that the international legal concept of territory is deeply shaped by colonial
epistemologies.138 She usefully describes the notion of territory in international law as
‘fundamentally Eurocentric, a specific articulation of ‘the rightful relationship between
community, authority and place,’ relying on abstractions that erase both land and relationality
with it.139 Martín also highlights how the concept of territory operates more broadly through
the mobility of capital,140 and cautions against a rigid notion, or conflation, between the state
and territoriality.’141 Yet it is still a particular form of violent deterritorialization that settler
colonial states necessarily assert through claiming legitimate sovereignty.
While I primarily focus on state claims, their authority and relationship to extractivism
cannot be completely legible without also acknowledging corporate influence in
constructions of these claims. Pahuja’s explanation of a history of competing claims to
authority between the company and the state helps to understand the overlapping forms of
influence claimed by corporate and state actors in relation to extractivism.142 Pahuja describes
both a rivalry and significant complicity between companies and states,143 arguing that
‘historically, the financial capital market and the state were mutually constitutive.’144 Elena
Blanco and Anna Grear also discuss the material basis of connections between capital,
extraction and Empire, and the centrality of the corporate form to consolidating state
power.145 They show how the transnational corporation as a formation enabled ‘early
mercantile capitalism,’ and they trace its particular influence and protection from this
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point.146 Overlapping corporate extractive activity also facilitates the state’s simultaneous
reproduction of its imperial and colonial positions through extractive projects.147 As Katerina
Teaiwa has identified regarding colonialism and the drive for phosphate consumption in
Banaba, ‘the colonial administration, businesses, and missionaries were a labyrinth of
intersecting political and economic interests and agendas.’148 These elements of extractivism:
coloniality in distinct forms, racialization, overlapping corporate and state power also frame
how claims to authority precede and arise from it.
Authority
I use two conceptual frames to consider the claims to authority in this thesis: jurisdiction and
narrative. Both registers help to examine the particularities of claims to authority, their
inability to be totalizing, and the violence they entail. By examining these as elements of
authority I am not intending to advance a definition of authority. Rather, I invoke them as
partial and overlapping insights into what authority is claimed from extractivism as well
asserted through it.

Jurisdiction
Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh’s influential work on jurisdiction suggests that we
can see jurisdiction as both the ‘ordering of authority’ and beyond such an ordering.149 They
show that jurisdiction ‘declares the existence of law and the authority to speak in the name of
the law […] it gives … a way of authorising law.’150 They explain that jurisdiction has
multiple elements, ‘material representations’ of authority such as mapping, technical
practices of ‘craft[ing]’ law, and ‘as practices, the idioms of jurisdiction concern the means of
creating and ordering law.’151 A number of scholars take up Dorsett and McVeigh’s work of
jurisdiction. Olivia Barr describes the notion of jurisdiction as ‘a mode of authorisation, both
ideationally and institutionally,’152 related to ‘technical and material practices.’153 She also
writes about jurisdiction’s potential to ‘ope[n] a domain of thought…concerned with how to
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live with law and how to create and engage lawful relations.’’154 It can, as Barr shows,
provide a way to think ‘beneath the rhetoric and representations of sovereignty and territory
that tend to dominate the ways in which we understand the place of law.’155 Pasternak has
also expressed that jurisdiction is a crucial way that authority is organized in settler
colonies,156 she writes ‘jurisdictional encounters produce colonial space.’157 Pasternak argues
that ‘state authority is produced and reproduced by drawing this line of difference around its
shifting spheres of influence.’158 She explains how, ‘settler-state logic is not a hegemonic
logic “out there” but a specific and active construction of authority through the limit-making
practices of jurisdiction.’159 Pasternak invokes Mariana Valverde’s insight that ‘state claims
to jurisdiction seek to naturalize its spatial differentiation,’160 when in fact imperial intrusions
into territory ‘composed a fabric that was full of holes.’161 Pahuja, writing about jurisdiction
and its potential as an analytical frame, argues that ‘an emphasis on legal form and practices
of authorization in the name of law,’ can expose competing claims to authority, decentring
state claims to totality.162 She offers an approach to thinking about legal authorization as
‘practices of authorization which are not fixed, final or settled, but ongoing, and always
encountering other - often rival – practices.’163 For my purposes, the analytic frame of
jurisdiction assists to expose the specific practices of authority claimed through extractive
projects, as well as treating these oppressive claims as non-totalizing, and interacting with
resistance from competing exercises of jurisdiction, legal and political practices. The method
of analysing technologies, or specific practices of generating authority that I argue emerge
from looking at the sites through the lens of extractivism, is closely linked to reading
authority through jurisdiction.
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Narrative
‘The monster’s discourse is premised upon absolutes, inevitability, and the lack of any
alternative to his proclaimed future order and authority.’164

If the work of jurisdiction exposes contested practices of asserting legal authority, the work
that narrative does for me in this thesis is to understand the connection between how a story
of law becomes authoritative, which is contested in a different way. The approach of reading
narrative also helps to expose law’s productive role. Ruth Buchanan engages international
law not as a regime but ‘an array of contexts, techniques and projects deeply entangled with
practices of ‘world-making.’’165 She continues, on understanding the nature of this embedded
partiality, ‘law is neither wholly distinct from, nor wholly determinative of, these complex
processes.’166 Craven, Pahuja and Simpson also highlight the productive role of narrative in
law, writing that international law functions in a way that should be considered as,
‘not merely ‘legitimating’ policies and practices or providing a vehicle for collaborative
endeavours, but authoring and organising global life, shaping identities, manufacturing
interests, stabilising borders, controlling access to resources, privileging and distributing
authority.’167

There are a number of lenses that I take up to look at the work of legal narratives, including
discourse and performance, archiving and myth. Although distinct, I engage each with the
purpose of examining how a legal narrative becomes authoritative. Discourse and
performance help to both examine exertions and justifications of authority, as well as to read
the productive dimensions of legal narratives as contested. Archiving helps to expose the
simultaneous facilitation and obfuscation that occurs in some narratives. Myth helps to
expose the key contradictions, violence and instability of specific claims to legal authority.168
These each are discussed with the aim of generating an engagement with the rich work on the
instability of legal narration, and its violence. I do not seek to produce an account of any
specific element, or of legal narration more broadly, but engage this work to better
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understand the links between not only the authority claimed by extractive projects, but also
that sought to be generated through them and their enactment and legitimization. Alongside
technologies, I use this work to generate a reading of the implications of claims to authority
through extractivism, and their potential unravelling. I engage each of these forms of
narrative as a way to better understand aspects of the central inquiry of this section, how
narrative generates authority.
Discourse and performance
Discourse and performance, for my purposes here, help to embed actors in discussions of
narrative as well as to expose narratives as contested, performed or utilized to gain authority.
Charlotte Peevers examines public discourse as a way to interrogate the tactics used by the
British and United States governments in justifying intervention and the use of force.169 She
argues that the purpose of this exercise is to reveal the inherent contestation and potential for
indeterminacy in legal justification, against a narrative of certainty.170 Peevers identifies the
potential for ‘thick descriptions’ and understandings to reveal useful points of departure in
public discourse, including a precise tracking of political economy, narrative role, and how it
produces ‘a particular set of meanings and lessons from history as imagistic, as imagined, as
always ready to change with each moment of rupture.’171 Peevers also invokes the notion of
juridical theatre as a way to re-read or counter-read narratives of legal authority.172 Reading
crises over control of the Suez Canal as plural, she takes ‘on the making of the crisis as a kind
of theatrical event,’173 asserting the ‘juridical significance of dramatic crisis,’174 situated with
‘distinct Cold War scripts,’175 while resisting the notion that a singular resolution would be
possible or desirable.176 The plurality of the crises she attributes to different meaning-making
projects, indeed a ‘crisis of meeting’177 and its attendant multiple effects ‘the choreography of
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the crisis simultaneously threatened to radically destabilise the existing legal order and to
entrench a repetition of particular forms of legal authorship and sovereign authority.’178
Indeed a dramatic reading is inherently connected to the juridicity of competing assertions.179
As Peevers states, ‘not one step removed from legal performance and authorship but
intrinsically intertwined with them.’180 In this way, its scripts also are both specific and
ongoing, shifting and recurring, which is a useful approach to interrogating the legal
narratives that I take up in this thesis. Following this, discourse and performance are useful
analytical frames to approach the multiplicity of legal narration, and the work done to seek to
authorize or stabilize one.
Archiving
Archiving is a concept that I engage with, through particular authors, to describe a specific
dual quality in certain legal narratives: that hiding a form of violence through narrative can
also authorize it.181 It is helpful for the analysis in this thesis as the forms of ordering
extractivism that I argue are authorized through claims to lawful authority are not explicitly
presented as supporting extractivism. For these reasons, the concept of archiving is
productive in exposing law’s relationship to particular forms of violence and the way that this
is authorized through narrative.182 Stewart Motha defines archiving as the way that legal
fictions simultaneously facilitate and deny or hide sovereign violence.183 He writes that, in his
work, the ‘“archive” is understood as both the origin and function of law.’184 Renisa Mawani
has also written on how law expands its authority through the archive, which is used to hide
law’s original and continuing violence.185 She calls this law’s ‘double logic of violence,’186
which she defines as a ‘reciprocal and reinforcing movement … the preservation and
destruction by which law generates the veracity of its own legality.’187 For instance, I will
178
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later argue that extractivism is utilized in this way to both found claims to authority to govern
Antarctica, and forms of global extractivism are implicitly justified and reproduced through
the maintenance of the structures of authority. Indeed, Motha shows how narratives of
authority reinscribe themselves and their violence into the future, explaining
‘Authority needs a story—an act of literature. Violence has a grip on the future, an
archival future that needs to be reimagined and reinscribed. The narratives of origin are
marked, re-marked, or sometimes (paradoxically) inscribed for the first time in the
process of being “recounted.” How does the law recognize and disavow sovereign
violence, and yet preserve forms of sovereignty founded on that violence?’188

Following Mawani, the archive is also a useful concept to understand the necessary
instability of legal narration, how any claim to totality is undermined by what is sought to be
repressed and obscured.189 Mawani uses Birrell’s work to show that law and the archive are
‘a place of haunting.’190 She says, ‘read through the archival turn, law as archive is an
unequal and incomplete regime of power/knowledge… It operates simultaneously as a
potentially oppressive modality of governance and a site of creative opening.’191 This will
later become important for me in considering the resistive possibilities inherent in the
liquidity, or instability of claims to authority that co-exists alongside the violence of these
claims. Mawani writes that instability persists despite ways that ‘law’s archive maintains a
juridico-political status that is both material and imaginary.’192 This instability or opening is
also a key methodological tool, which means that the tracing of imperial and colonial
strategies is not presented as totalizing or eschewing resistance. It is this idea of law as
archive that allows legal narratives to be examined for how they construct the fiction of
original, proper, or singular authority. These constructions are prevalent in the examples that
I discuss in this thesis.
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Mythology
Mythology is another analytical frame that I use to unpack the relationship between the
instability and violence in claims to law and authority, particularly in a universalized imperial
international law or the law of a settler colonial state. States use both of these forms of law to,
impossibly, claim a singular and totalizing legal position. In using the work of mythology, I
draw from Peter Fitzpatrick’s seminal work, The Mythology of Modern Law. Fitzpatrick’s
principal argument is that ‘law as a unified entity can only be reconciled with its
contradictory existences if we see it as myth.’193 Many scholars have taken up Fitzpatrick’s
insights and also engage the mythological qualities of modern law. For instance, Shane
Chalmers explains Fitzpatrick’s insight that mythological reconciliation of contradictions
within modern law (including what I refer to here as state law or colonial law) is needed to
project coherence, ‘despite being intrinsically plural, the law remains ‘distinct, unified and
internally coherent.’’194 Adil Hasan Khan also engages Fitzpatrick’s work, writing that ‘to
make this disparate discourse cohere … ‘deific attributes’ would be required.’195 Yet as
Chalmers also highlights, ‘‘law as myth’ that showed the constitutive relation between
racialised imperialism and Occidental modern law,’196 that ‘this particular mythology is
essentially racist, having been forged in the experience of European colonialism.’197 Hasan
Khan’s analysis of the uncertainty and violence of law’s myths proposes that what is required
in these times is ‘an account that is attentive to and orientates us towards … other (international) laws.’198 He argues that ‘in a world in which the ‘(white) mythic conscience’ of the
‘moderns’ is slowly unravelling,’199 where ‘mythological consciousness has been partially
torn, such that the older mythology no longer orders the world but still lingers on as a
remnant that could potentially be appropriated by newer mythologies, now jostling to take its
place.’200 The work of mythology as an analytic is crucial to exposing the dual quality of
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violence and instability in the legal discourse asserted over the sites I look at, as well as to
read it as a partial account amongst multiple legal narratives.
The work of legal narratives, including discourse and performance, archiving and myth, each
enable a particular way to examine the instability of the state’s legal narration, and its
violence. These distinct frames are drawn together by a concern with how a particular legal
narrative becomes authoritative, and what the implications of this claim to authority are. Part
of the way that I analyse these links is through close attention to narratives and the forms of
authority asserted through them. These frames are a useful set of locations because they assist
to understand and expose the links between, not only the authority claimed by extractive
projects, but also that sought to be generated through them.
Part 2: Methods
There are two ways that I have primarily thought about method. One is through an attention
to history, partly because as Pahuja notes, discussing international law ahistorically commits
an account to a problematic teleology of progress.201 It is also the case that the Antarctic
debates occur within a particular time that is necessarily linked to various conceptions of
history – the Cold War. Decontextualizing or disembedding these debates would work to
obscure the ways in which they can be understood today. I engage history as a method
briefly, so as to be able to do this contextualising work, although my account is not a history
as such. The second, and one that I spend more time with, is attending to technologies as
practices of authority-making. This helps to examine the specific violence, instability and
points of rupture and resistance of the authority-extractivism relationships as I have read
them in these two sites. It will also help to draw out in the concluding chapter the
implications for these moves toward claiming authority. Through a close reading of the
discourse on restraining extraction for each site, I draw from these two methods in distinct
ways. In the chapter on Antarctica I investigate the technologies enacted through the
international legal framework and its effects in relation to the sustaining dynamics of global
extractivism.202 In the chapter on the Murray-Darling I investigate the historical context and
continuities between previous extractive interventions and current discourse of sustainable
diversion.
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Histories, and telling them
Pahuja argues that any account that engages international law ‘requires an appreciation of its
history,’203 specifically a ‘critical or unofficial history which is attentive to power.’204 She
shows how accounts that take the historical formation of the law for granted are problematic
for how they present law, ‘understood implicitly as having been formed or ‘fixed’ at some
point outside the time or place of the history being told.’205 Craven, Pahuja and Simpson
outline a strategy of ‘unreading’ conventional historiography.206 Craven also engages the
possibility of work that pays close attention to distinctive world-making practices and does
not reproduce narratives of universalization through narrating a teleological path.207
Similarly, I have not chosen to present a linear history, although each of these stories of
extractivism has long historical roots. The form of the Murray-Darling story takes a more
continuous approach. Yet, particularly for speaking about Antarctica, I draw from Rose
Parfitt’s historiographical proposal of a ‘‘modular’ approach.’208 Aspects of her work, she
explains, are conceived ‘not as links in a single chain, but instead as separate but related
historical ‘items’ placed within a theoretical ‘frame.’’209 This is a helpful methodological
point to follow as it outlines how a particular moment, for my purposes a set of debates, can
be part of a non-linear historiographical inquiry. Parfitt relates each item by and within her
theoretical frame. I have related the debates to techniques of space-making and temporalities
that are necessarily connected to other times and locations. I use these relationships to argue
that the forms of global extractivism I suggest are authorized through the debates I examine
cannot be temporally or spatially confined to that particular year or to the Antarctic continent.
In adopting this approach, however, Parfitt cautions that thick descriptions that focus on
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complexity and contextualisation don’t lose political charge.210 I focus on a particular
moment and its relationship to imperial legal imaginaries and practices in order to draw out
the political consequences of the debates and the system of authority being debated in order
to not accept the ways in which this might be hidden in the accounts of certain signatory state
actors. In thinking with a modular approach that does not disengage with structural violence,
I also draw from Susan Marks and Andrew Lang’s proposal of a Benjaminian reading of
historiography. Particular methodological elements from Marks and Lang’s analysis include
Walter Benjamin’s exposition of historical ‘similarity and contact’ and ‘the ‘flash’ that was
his way of expressing historical comprehension.’211 They explain his notion of the flash, a
‘memory’ of the past as a way of being in contact with or understanding it.212 The idea of the
‘flash,’ for my purposes, also helps to understand the way a historic moment can continue to
speak today. Because my account of extractivism is related to legal structures concerning
Antarctica and focuses on a specific set of debates, the idea of a modular history, or the
moment of a flash is helpful in understanding what can be drawn from a historic moment as
well as or instead of looking at a sequence. For my purposes, attention to historical moments,
whether continuous or modular, helps to see the ways extractivism is ordered by state or
international law, even if current discourse does not explicitly engage extractive projects.

Technologies
Technologies as a methodological tool enables tracing the specific operation of legal
regimes.213 Valverde notes in work drawing from Michel Foucault that ‘plural powers
necessarily deploy plural knowledges – [so] we will be motivated to study the workings of
particular knowledge moves.’214 In this thesis, attending to particular techniques help to
expose both extractive ordering, and the generation of authority as they are visible in a
specific instance. Dorsett and McVeigh explain the relationship between examining
technologies and forms of jurisdiction as looking at ‘how the technologies of jurisdiction are
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engaged in the creation and arrangement of lawful relations, and with how the technologies
of jurisdiction give us the form of law.’215 They usefully define technology as an inquiry in
the following way
‘Technology derives from the Greek technê, meaning craft, art or strategy. In a classical
sense, technê described a power or capacity to produce things whose eventual existence
was contingent upon the exercise of that power; things whose existence was ‘caused’ by
the craftsman. Technê (craft), as opposed to epistêmê (knowledge), connotes practical
knowledge or practices ordered towards the production of something.’216

This definition is helpful for my purposes for highlighting a number of relevant elements,
particularly the strategy, the productive dimension of a technology, and its relation to power.
The technologies that I examine here are space-making, imaginaries, temporality and
movement.

Space-making
‘Settler colonialism and extractive capitalism reorganized space and time.’217

A spatial analysis is central to my thesis because the way that extractivism is authorized in
the set of debates concerning Antarctic authority cannot be grasped without a dispersed and
interconnected conception of space, rather than one that is confined to the Antarctic
continent. In Chapter 3, space also becomes an important tool of analysis. In that case it
helps, not to make the argument that extractivism is authorized, which I argue occurs through
the material practices of movement, division and commodification, but rather to expose the
consequences of how these extractive practices generate a colonial legality. In this way, the
extractivism directed towards the Murray-Darling river system is relevant beyond this region
in considering techniques of the settler colonial state of Australia to project a singular,
totalizing form of legal authority. In the last chapter, spatialized legal ordering becomes a
relevant analytic to read the implications of multiple resistive possibilities and challenges to
the forms of legal ordering that authorize extractivism and how authority is spatially
distributed.218
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Defining space as an analytic, Martín writes that beyond a ‘geophysical referent,’ space is
also social.219 He explains that his engagement with critical space theory produces a plural
concept of space, neither as a ‘container’ or solely a result of construction.220 Barr invokes a
definition of space as the
‘outcome of a series of highly problematic temporary settlements that divide and connect
things up into different kinds of collectives which are slowly provided with the means
which render them durable and sustainable.’221

Martín also argues that focusing on contests over authority is helpful for seeing how spaces
of extractivism are created, ‘the complex and embedded spatiality of social and political
practices that have built these multiple extractivist spaces.’222 Martín particularly speaks of
constructions of ‘heterotopic’ or ‘other’ spaces, which I take as a productive way of
examining the particular epistemic construction of extraction from waters and ice.223 Sarah
Keenan writes of the benefits of using space as a concept in legal work, ‘factors that are
otherwise overlooked come into view.’224 For instance, Pasternak highlights how
interrogating the spatiality of legal assertions can reveal how ‘dominant spatial
representations of jurisdiction … have obscured its highly political work.’225 She writes,
‘though the space of state territory is projected as an undifferentiated, absolute, and bounded
space, it is in fact nothing of the sort.’226 In doing so, spatiality and legality do not necessarily
need to be considered as a binary, but rather as overlapping forms of ordering. Barr describes
David Delaney’s identification of a false binary between law and space, ‘arising from the
dichotomies encoded in the formulation of the field itself as law as ‘legality’ and geography
as spatiality,’227 and Craven, Pahuja and Simpson also refer to the interrelatedness as
‘juridical spatiality.’228 This is relevant for drawing a co-constitutive connection between
practices of jurisdiction or legal narratives that work to claim authority over space, as we will
see occurring in distinct ways in both substantive chapters.
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Equally, space requires time to render it legible.229 Keenan and Barr both draw from Doreen
Massey’s formulation of space, Barr writing that ‘space is not timeless, but is in fact timefull,’230 and Keenan showing that conceiving of space as ‘not fixed in time’231 helps to
disrupt ‘the Western philosophical privileging of time over space.’232 The interaction between
technologies of space-making and temporality is visible in the ways signatory states to the
Antarctic Treaty construct an imperial legality that locates the power to decide, extract and
profit in the global North. Gómez-Barris also writes on how extractivism ‘demarcates [both]
the temporalities and spatial catastrophe of the planetary through a universalizing idiom and
viewpoint that hides the political geographies embedded within the conversion of complex
life.’233 This becomes important because although I analyse technologies of space-making
and temporalities separately in the chapter on the Antarctic debates, the technologies work
together and it helps to also hold them in mind as both contributing to constructions of a
global extractivism that is visible in an international context of imperial ordering.
Techniques of space-making, including disciplinary knowledge forms, that scholars examine
to reveal specific elements of legal construction are enacted in multiple ways. Here I briefly
consider the work of the knowledges of geography and geology, which are both prevalent
discourses in justifying extractivism in the examples of this thesis. In discussions of
extraction in Antarctica, an imperial geography is constructed to maintain existing
international economic ordering and reinforce the North profiting from extraction. In the
Murray-Darling example, a rendering of the river as non-living resource works to make
commodifying it more legible.
The language of geography is often utilized to naturalize developmentalist interventions, as
Timothy Mitchell’s work shows.234 Mapping work is a key technology of colonialisms, and
Gómez-Barris also speaks of mapping projects using surveillance technologies to produce
knowledges that contribute to extractive projects.235 Gevers also describes what he terms
‘imaginative geography,’ a concept he links writing with imagining (and reimagining) global
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ordering.236 Speaking of Pan-Africanism and literary interventions, he writes about the
project’s ‘imaginative counter-geography’ or ‘radical ‘imaginative geography.’’237 He defines
imaginative geography as ‘the (political) geography of ‘openly imaginative’ texts’238 and ‘the
imaginative nature of (political) geography.’239 Writing about a W. E. B. Du Bois essay from
1921 and its interruption to ‘the forms, temporality and orientation of geography,’ he argues
that the essay ‘disturb[s] the innocence of geography and politicize[s] the writing of global
space.’240 Gevers argues that attending to imaginative geography also exposes the discipline
of geography as also constructed by imaginaries and discourse, albeit with strong material
effects.241 He characterizes the way of seeing produced by geographic knowledge as, ‘the
central conceit remains that ‘geography does not argue; it just is.’’242 In the way that
naturalizing discourses of geography can be put to work in claiming authority, it is useful to
consider geographical proclamations as partially as space-making technology, and partially
an imaginary – a complex system of representation. This is in part due in part to the role of
geographical knowledge and imaginaries instituting imperial violence through international
law.243
Taking geology as a forms of constructed knowledge production involved with extraction,
Kathyrn Yusoff explains her work as intended ‘to undermine the givenness of geology as an
innocent or natural description of the world.’244 She says geology helps solidify the operation
of property and commodification, ‘property as an acquisition (as resource, land, extractive
quality of energy or mineral),’245 and cites a number of strategies where the discipline works
to ‘enact territorial extraction (through survey, classification, codification, and
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annexation).’246 In the Murray-Darling example here, rendering the river as a non-living
resource works to make commodifying it more legible. Yusoff elaborates on the implications
of this rendering, ‘geology is a relation of power and continues to constitute racialized
relations of power,’ she argues, that ‘in its material manifestation in mining, petrochemical
sites and corridors, and their toxic legacies – all over a world that resolutely cuts exposure
along color lines.’247 Engaging space-making techniques beyond these particular disciplinary
knowledge forms, Charles Mills highlights the volume of work on a ‘white spatial
imaginary,’248 and Pasternak draws on work by ‘black radical tradition focused on sociospatial constructions of racial difference.’249 The state’s spatial construction of legality over
the Murray-Darling is in this way inseparable from an analysis of racialized claims to
authority, ownership and possession.250
The way that these space-making technologies will be used throughout this thesis is for their
relationship to extractivism, how particular global geographies and discourses of geology
sustain and naturalize where extraction occurs and who benefits. This is the way that I read
the imperial geography imagined by signatory states debating the Antarctic Treaty as
contributing to legitimizing Northern extraction from the global South, as well as rendering
the rivers of the Murray-Darling as non-living resources and therefore more easily
commodifiable.

Imaginaries
It might seem counter-intuitive to read an imaginary as a form of technology, rather than
related to narrative or knowledge forms. Yet it is a helpful way to read space-making
techniques and the ordering implicit in them.251 Another way of speaking about the imperial
geography relied upon by signatory states in the Antarctic debates as an imperial spatial
imaginary. As I referred to earlier, in outlining what I take an imaginary to mean, Jasanoff’s
explanation of socio-technical imaginaries as ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and
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publicly performed visions of desirable futures’252 is helpful, even though I read the
imaginaries performed in extractive projects as derived from and producing ordering beyond
socio-technicality.
In relation to imaginaries that reinforce extractivism, Surabhi Ranganathan and Craven’s
descriptions of imaginaries embedded in the law of the sea and the law of outer space,
respectively, are productive. Ranganathan shows how legal imaginaries ‘reified’ and
constituted an ‘an extractive imaginary of the ocean floor.’253 She demonstrates how this
extractive imaginary of the seabed relied on (and continues to rely on) positing it as
disconnected from social and legal relations and jurisdiction.254 Ranganathan examines how
colonial fears over decolonization and Cold War tensions contributed to a world-view of the
sea where ‘exploration,’ extraction and imperialism were re-inscribed.255 She writes, ‘the law
turns the seabed over to the extractive interests of states and corporations.’256 Craven traces
the development of legal frameworks for outer space in the context of Cold War rivalry and
contest. He explains, using Foucault’s ‘image of the mirror,’ how imaginaries can function by
‘bringing into being, through its conceptual and institutional architecture, a space that is at
once imaginary (futural, anticipatory, mythopoetic) and real.’257 Craven also usefully links
the imaginaries of extractivism and accumulation to imperial projects,258 which is key to
understanding the legal narratives that this thesis explores. The work of deeply inscribed
extractive imaginaries, particularly the notion of ‘conceptual and institutional architecture’259
and the creation of space helps read the delineation of authority and authorization of
extraction by signatory states in the imaginaries created by legal discourse mobilized in
debating the Antarctic Treaty System.
Jasanoff describes an imaginary’s potential effect as ‘neither cause nor effect in a
conventional sense but rather a continually rearticulated awareness of order in social life.’260
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And referring to Donna Haraway’s analysis of the Natural Science Museum she highlights
how, ‘the dioramas she interprets are first and foremost “meaning machines.” Like all
machines they freeze social relations, reinforcing an impression of predestination that
analysts should seek to dissolve.’261 Buchanan’s work on Jacques Rancière’s description of
the politics of aesthetics is also instructive. She writes that this work can contribute
understanding ‘the distribution of the sensible… the see-able and the sayable.’262 This
distribution operates on multiple levels, including through ‘a delimitation of spaces and
times, of the visible and the invisible.’263 The frame of the imaginary and its meanings and
distributions is a useful way to read the spatial ordering of authority that signatory states
imagine and perform through debating the Antarctic Treaty.
Temporalities
Techniques of constructing a homogenous, linear temporality that I will argue seek to
reinforce discovery as a legitimate mode of claiming authority are visible in the Antarctic
debates. This reinforcement stabilizes both imperial extraction and authority. Mawani
explains how ‘law not only responds to external temporalities; it also absorbs and obscures
them. It expands and compresses time by emphasizing, erasing, and recasting historical
events.’264 Bhandar also shows how ‘temporalities of colonialism… are multiple and
uneven.’ 265 She positions these in opposition to imperial/colonial discourses of linear time,
‘with the non-European world placed either at some earlier stage of development or outside
history altogether.’266 Mawani also writes about how British ‘imperial temporalities’ were
asserted to the exclusion of ‘the histories and chronologies of many diverse and
heterogeneous communities’ in India during times of formal Empire.267 She uses Partha
Chatterjee’s critique of ‘empty homogeneous time that has been repeatedly evoked by critics
of empire … is not an inhabited or lived time but one that is thought and projected.’268
Buchanan and Pahuja also engage Chatterjee’s work, writing (of the development project and
constituting forms of the nation-state as ‘modern’ or of a supposedly different time) that
‘nation-states are therefore perceived not to co-exist equally in their heterogeneity in the
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same time-space, but rather are conceptually captured and arranged in a hierarchical
progression from past to present to future.’269 Keenan’s focus is on a distinct legal regime,
property (and possibilities for subversive property), yet her analysis of its dominant
tendencies are relevant, it ‘tends to be (re)productive of the status quo, to produce linear time
and help the world retain its shape.’270 Mills also shows how racialized imaginaries of time
and temporality are just as operative as racialized space.271 Racial regimes, Mills argues, not
only govern access to space and time, but structure society,272 in ways that he describes as a
‘chronological cartography of Whiteness,’ influenced by Western notions of theology and
temporality.273 The abstractions and attempted universality of this temporality is then, Mills
argues, ‘timelessness and racelessness,’274 ‘so that the immanent realization of the abstract
norm (raceless humanity, which is White humanity) is already waiting to be unfolded.’275 The
implications of this ordering, he states, are that ‘the general transdisciplinary pattern of
modernity … is reinforced and exacerbated here by the discipline’s pretensions to
timelessness and abstract truth.’276
This homogeneity and linearity that produce racialized claims to possession and authority are
also visible in and produced by international law’s narratives. Richard Joyce shows how
liberal international law depends on a problematic idea of ‘its messianic promise,’
constructing justifications for stasis or unfulfillment.277 Joyce’s argument is based in a
consideration about ‘how messianic ideas of redemption and fulfilment (either in this world
or the next) can structure and constrain thought about international law,’278 both in relation to
temporality and history.279 Joyce writes about how certain phenomena (in his case the Cold

269

Chatterjee cited in Ruth Buchanan and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Law, Nation and (Imagined) International
Communities’ (2004) 8 Law Text Culture 137 at 159.
270
Keenan, supra note 218 at 14.
271
Mills, supra note 248 at 27. See also Charles Mills, “The Chronopolitics of Racial Time,” (2020) 29:2 Time
& Society 297.
272
Ibid at 28-29.
273
Ibid at 30. He continues, ‘both macro- and meso-periodizations reveal the traces of the White scalpel, as the
postcolonial critique has long since shown.’ Ibid.
274
Ibid at 32.
275
Ibid.
276
Ibid.
277
Richard Joyce, ‘International law and the Cold War: Reflections on the Concept of History’ in Craven,
Pahuja & Simpson, supra note 12 at 45.
278
Ibid at 28.
279
He also points to an ‘eschatology’ of an ‘endless repetition of same-times’ in his analysis of Carl Schmitt’s
fascist account of international law. The endless repetition refers to Schmitt’s account, and he refuses both Carl
Schmitt’s conception of history as well as a liberal teleology. Ibid at 28. As Craven, Pahuja and Simpson
explain in relation to Joyce’s description of these different constructions of time working on law ‘each of these
accounts… has attendant effects, either by operating as an apology for the power of the guarantors of concrete

38

War) can be posited as placing ‘time itself under pressure in one direction or another,’
simultaneously an ‘accelerator of time,’ and ‘a force of restraint.’280 To work against these
conceptualizations, and to emphasise potentiality, Joyce engages Benjamin’s notion of ‘a
more fragmented sense’281 of time, emphatically opposed to teleology of progression
‘through a homogeneous, empty time.’282 This time is a ‘now-time,’283 any messianic
presence is engaged not in teleology but disruption, ‘small gateways’ or ‘splinters.’284 These
ideas of temporality are also related to a way to engage histories, but for my purposes I will
argue that they can show how technologies of linear time-making can work to authorize
forms of authority that reinforce extractivism by reinforcing racialized and distributive
binaries inherent to legitimizing the doctrine of discovery prevalent in the specific debates
over Antarctica that I look at in this thesis.

Movement
Movement, particularly as a technology of jurisdiction drawn from Barr’s work, is how I
analyse the ways that current state interventions towards the Murray-Darling river system are
continuous with early colonial extractive division of the waters. It is also an important way to
highlight how material practices of building a colonial claim to lawful authority are both
generated and unstable. Barr writes about the Anglo-Australian common law, alternatively
referred to here as the colonial state’s law, projects and imaginary of being static, complete
and total, obscuring its movement and instability. In this way, Barr describes the common
law imaginary as encompassing ‘all available legal spaces,’285 in a way that is ‘non-textured,
evenly distributed.’286 Barr argues that the projection of colonial law as totalizing both
suggests exclusive legal authority as well as the lack of space for movement.287 She
elaborates on this imaginary, it is based on a view of space as abstract, ‘where space is fixed,
apolitical and pre-given.’288 Barr explains that although colonial legal imaginaries construct
the common law as unique and totalizing, ‘coherent, fixed and singular space somehow filled
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with a single form of law;’289 ‘common law is not quite as everywhere as it might seem to
be.’290 She warns against colonial obscuring of movement (of the common law), as they
movements ‘tend to collapse into sovereignty, territory and territorial sovereignty in a certain
imagining of legal place.’291 ‘Everywhere’ as a projection is of course a form of colonial
erasure of First Nations’ laws, and, as Barr describes, ‘a counter-image of multiple forms of
laws in an abstract ‘single’ space provides a more textured, erratic and inconsistent spatial
landscaping of the space.’292 She points to the fact that if space is already full, common law is
seen as unmoving, which obscures the extent that movement that is central to imperial
techniques.293 Indeed Barr argues that in fact movement is ‘how common law comes to be, or
at least how common law seems to come to be, in place.’294 Attending to movement also
assists in exposing certain instabilities in claims to authority, ‘in contrast to the highly
suggestive images of sovereign territory representing a fixed, immovable and somehow
complete place of law in both space and time, there is some sort of limitation to common
law's movements.’295 As I will argue, movement can expose claims to authority and
extractivism when the movement (in the example, of river water entitlements) is framed in
terms of sustainability rather than extraction. This is because the techniques of moving,
dividing and exchanging water are largely continuous with techniques that initially positioned
the rivers of the Murray-Darling as an extractive site. Additionally, drawing from Barr’s
insights about creation of law through movement can expose attempts to place the law of the
colonial state at the centre of controlling the rivers.
Attending to the particular techniques of claims to authority, here space-making, imaginaries,
temporality and movement help to illuminate the kinds of ways extractive authority may be
claimed in the examples I turn to now. These ways of engaging method help to show how a
historical moment can be brought to bear on discourses of progress against extractivism to
show how extractivism may be indeed continuing through the forms of authority claimed.
Examining specific technologies as a method helps to show how this authority is enacted in
each case.296 Through the method of technologies I seek to engage the work of jurisdiction, to
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see space-making and authorizing temporality and movement as material practices of
claiming authority to decide the law.297 The imaginary as a technology of jurisdiction, in my
account, helps to reveal the productive dimensions of a legal narrative and how it claims
authority. I also use the method of history partially to examine changes or continuities in
jurisdictional practice and narratives, and to better appreciate both the violence and instability
of these particular forms of legal production and ordering.
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Chapter 2 – Antarctic debates and extractive space-time298
Introduction
My analysis in this chapter focuses on a specific set of debates at the United Nations that
occurred during the late Cold War. I investigate the technologies enacted through these
debates and ask how they affect the sustaining dynamics of global extractivism. In these
debates, state actors contest both the Antarctic Treaty system and the way it distributes
authority over the continent, as well as access to resources in Antarctic territory. I will
suggest that returning to this point of contest, and particularly paying attention to how
signatory states defended the Treaty framework, allows a deeper consideration of what forms
of authority and extraction these signatory state actors sought to remake and maintain.299
Specifically, I will argue that the relationship between forms of extractivism and authority is
revealed through paying attention to the way that the doctrine of discovery is defended as the
legitimate basis of sovereignty over Antarctica and consequent authority to govern the
territory. Additionally, the dynamics of this relationship are visible in the way signatory
states sought to both appropriate and dismiss the discourse of the common heritage of
mankind, as it was mobilized in these debates by certain state actors who formed part of the
Non-Aligned Movement. Attending to the links between the forms of authority and
extractivism at stake here can better reveal whether a localized mining ban is sufficient
contestation of what I argue is signatory states’ attempt to reconstruct imperial geographies,
and the consequent materially extractive impacts beyond Antarctica that this authorizes. The
way that I organize the chapter sets out to show this through examining interactions between
analytics of the imaginary and the material, notably how global imperial imaginaries
reperformed in these debates contribute to material practices of extraction beyond Antarctic
territory. In my reading of these particular debates, narratives of discovery and the discourse
of the common heritage of mankind are related to temporal and space-making practices
implemented by signatory state actors. I read this from particular state submissions that
preceded the General Assembly discussions. Firstly, I give context to the debates themselves,
that occurred towards the end of 1984. Secondly, I examine the role that narratives of
discovery play in legitimizing a linear temporality and reject any disruption to the distribution
298
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of authority over Antarctica. Thirdly, I examine ways that contestations over the discourse of
the common heritage of mankind are utilized by the signatory state actors that I pay particular
attention to reproduce imperial divisions of space that also work to authorize extractivism
beyond the Antarctic continent. I then also read these techniques for how they are entangled,
rather than distinct from, these state actors’ claims to authority beyond Antarctica.
The debates
Towards the end of 1984 the United Nations General Assembly returned to debating ‘the
question of Antarctica.’300 Prompted by proposals in 1983 from a number of states in the
global South to obtain more transparent information about the Antarctica continent and
contest the Treaty system which governed it,301 states made written submissions prior to the
1984 meetings.302 The debates in 1984 ran for multiple sessions of the General Assembly’s
First Committee.303 The debates focused on the distribution of authority over Antarctica by
the Treaty system,304 including regarding resource use, and the basis of the claims to
sovereignty by discovery that the Treaty system implicitly preserves.305 Administration of the
Treaty System occurs through Consultative Meetings.306 States can be added to the Treaty
system by acceding to it either as a Consultative Party, which enables participation in
decision-making, or with non-Consultative Party status.307 Consultative Party status can be
obtained by a state that proves sufficient connection to the Antarctic continent, usually
through scientific operations.308 The Antarctic Treaty itself was signed in 1959 in
300
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Washington by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and South Africa.309 One principal
effect of the Treaty is to place claims of sovereignty over Antarctic territory in abeyance.310
Claims of sovereignty to Antarctic had been made by the United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, Norway, Chile, Argentina and France from the early 20th Century onwards on the
stated grounds of exploration and discovery.311 The United States and the Soviet Union did
not actively claim sovereignty at the time the Treaty came into effect, but did not recognize
existing claims and continue to reserve the right to make them.312 Another primary effect of
the Treaty is to ban military and nuclear activity, including nuclear waste disposal,313 and the
Treaty has since also been amended with additional conservation protocols for marine life.314
Following the centrality of mineral resources to the 1984 debates,315 an additional protocol
was drafted to regulate Antarctic mining in the late 1980s.316 It never came into effect,
however, and was replaced by the Protocol on Environmental Protection, signed in Madrid in
1991, which bans mining.317
Reading the submissions, I found that the question of control over Antarctic resources was
central to discussions of distribution of authority over the continent. The question of
resources was raised partially in response to the proposed drafting of a mineral regulation
convention by signatory states.318 In this proposal, when signatory states discussed the future
use of regulatory regimes of mineral resources, they were careful to preserve guaranteed
access for signatory states should mining become feasible in Antarctica. For instance, the
United States’ representatives state its interest in the ‘non-discriminatory access’ to all
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potential mining sites.319 The debates, particularly on the question of resources, received
significant media attention at the time. The Convention to regulate resources and mining, as
drafted by representative for New Zealand Christopher Beeby, was described by one
publication as environmentally insufficient, ‘Beeby’s Slick Solution.’320 Some parts of the
international legal literature took a more adjudicative tone: describing the debates as
politicized, turning to international legal doctrine to assess the merits of claims regarding the
common heritage of mankind, and further appealing to international law’s potential as a
stronger enforcement mechanism to protect the Antarctic environment.321 The debates also
help to expose links between the question of resources and a contest over the way authority is
distributed in the Antarctic Treaty System. Specifically, if the Treaty produces peace, science
and environmental protection or whether it reinforces colonialism and preserves access to
resources for a few states.322 What I want to do in this chapter is revisit these debates to reexamine this moment and investigate the role of international law in constructing forms of
extractivism that might persist despite the formal mining ban. There were previously other
challenges to the Antarctic Treaty System,323 but I have chosen this set of debates as one
potential site of rupture and contest that challenged international ordering of authority and
access to resources and profit.
The description of the debates as a contest does not imply a binary form. There were a range
of positions taken, and while I argue that signatory states aim to reconstruct an imperial
geography that enables resource extraction by the global North including in global South
territories, this distinction does not impute a sharp binary or an absolute claim about each
state involved.324 A number of Latin American states supported maintaining the Treaty
System, and India and Brazil had recently acceded as Consultative Parties.325 The discourse
used by those states supporting the Treaty is also divergent, from more minimalist discourse
319
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about the Treaty being likely to be the most feasible option, in part due to the late Cold War
context,326 to open invocations of colonial discovery by, amongst other states, Australia and
the United Kingdom.327 Discourses of peace in the context of Cold War tensions, as well as
of scientific endeavour are invoked by the United States.328 Without requiring the
construction of a binary, there is nevertheless a strong view advanced by a number of states
from the Non-Aligned Movement that contests the colonial doctrines of discovery that
sovereignty claims are founded on and that the Treaty preserves by not addressing.329
Some international legal literature has largely accepted the Treaty as a success of the
discipline, including as an anti-extractive success.330 Yet attending to space-making and
temporal technologies provides a critique into the imaginary, narratives and practices
associated with the Antarctica Treaty and how states use these techniques and claims to
bolster or legitimize their authority both nationally and internationally.331 What I suggest can
be found in these debates is not merely a discussion about constructing Antarctica as a
material source to draw hydrocarbons from, which is the account that focusing on the
doctrinal changes to mineral regulation might expose. Rather I will argue that the
construction of the continent as a material source to draw upon goes far beyond mineral
resources. As Scott points to, it is the ‘non-reciprocal’ relation of extractivism that is more
distinctive.332 The continent is turned to, repeatedly, by states who are party to the Treaty
System as a source: of scientific information, security, and even future fresh water. Reading
these debates, I found that the way in which the Treaty was defended constructs Antarctica as
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a source to draw from, both materially and as a legal imaginary, well beyond a strict focus on
mining regulation.
While extractivism typically involves violent taking of resources such as oil and gas, Martín
shows how there is nothing necessarily natural about the kind of resources generally
associated with extractive projects. He states ‘‘natural resources’ such as minerals are
produced and reproduced through a political process. In other words, they become
‘resources’ through political relations, operations and space production.’333 The Australian
state, for instance, adopts a wide definition of resources, beyond minerals and hydrocarbon
resources to include ‘marine living resources (krill, fin fish, seals, whales and other marine
life); ice; wilderness; wildlife/unique assemblage of species; scenery; biological or genetic
diversity; and special and unusual research opportunities.’334 It posits these as resources,
‘such a listing of natural resources tends to shade into values of the region that, while not
specifically “stocks that can be drawn upon”, are of significance to man.’335 The central
insight to draw from this definition is the quality of the characterization, how Antarctic space
is posited and mobilized as a resource.
Relatedly, and more relevantly in terms of its operation, I found that the Treaty being
ferociously defended by some signatory states also exposed the contest over colonial
imaginaries of space, temporality and the distribution of authority. To suggest this
construction, I read these debates with a particular emphasis on how certain signatory states
defending the Treaty characterized Antarctica and their relationship to the continent. I also
argue that the identification of Antarctica as a source, or resource, has close, co-constitutive,
relationships to authority and extractivism, or extractive consequences and relationships.
Examining where this extractivism is located in a temporal and spatial sense, I argue that it
cannot be contained to a separate and discrete analysis of Antarctic territory. Spatially, the
construction of Antarctica in these debates relies on and legitimizes extractivism in other
locations, which some signatory states assume access to through constructions of imperial
geography. As I will argue, temporally, Antarctica is constructed as a guarded space that
provides future resources to signatory states. Past extractivism, such as the sealing trade, is
both used as evidence of discovery and effective occupation in order to found sovereignty
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claims. This linear temporality authorizes discovery as a form of current lawful authority.
The implications of these spatial and temporal techniques reveal a complicated set of
narratives and practices of extractivism and authority that undergird the Treaty System.336

Authorizing temporalities
In this section I examine the role that narratives of discovery play in legitimizing a linear
temporality to reject disruption to the distribution of authority over Antarctica. It is important
to note that the linearity of the temporality is not the point as such, rather that the linearity
works to authorize authority founded on ‘discovery’ and possession and project an idea that
those foundations are both legitimate and no longer relevant.337 This contradiction relies on
both the linearity of the form of time constructed by signatory states in these debates, as well
as a notion of ‘progress’ that would reformulate possession with a basis in extraction as
sovereignty with a basis in discovery.338 This contradiction exposes a close co-constitution
between extractivism and claims to authority over Antarctica.

Narratives of discovery
A number of signatory states describe discovery as the basis of their current interests in
Antarctic territory, including the authority to participate in the Treaty. These claims to
sovereignty and rightful ownership and authority are crucial to both understanding the
contests over the doctrine of discovery and how it relates to the contest over designating
Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind in these debates. For example, Australia states
that its ‘claim to sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) is based on acts
of discovery and exploration by British and Australian navigators and explorers going back to
the time of Captain Cook, and subsequent continuous occupation, administration and
control.’339 The state asserts that this claim to sovereignty is grounded in ‘proclamations of
title on behalf of the British Crown;’340 when ‘in 1929 the British Government decided, in
consultation with the Australian and New Zealand Governments, that it would transfer to
each of them the areas of Antarctica closest to their respective territories.’341 The United
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Kingdom proclaims to be ‘the first State to become involved in Antarctica with the voyage of
Captain Cook in 1772-1775,’342 additionally claiming to be ‘the first to undertake the
regulation of Antarctic activity by means of the application of territorial sovereign rights,’343
and Argentina also claims that ‘Antarctic history began when Christopher Columbus landed
in America and the Spanish tried to find the south-west passage.’344 Although the United
States and Russia do not maintain a current territorial claim, in these debates the former
Soviet Union also claimed to be the first state to discover the territory,345 and the United
States claims that that their explorations were more significant in their scientific capacity.
Representatives to the United States assert that ‘New England sailors were prominent in the
first big wave of exploration of Antarctica, when seal hunters flocked to Antarctic waters in
the 1820s. Little is known of their no doubt extensive reconnaissance of the Antarctic
Peninsula area, since the sealers guarded their cruise logs and landfalls as proprietary
secrets.346 Submissions maintain both that
‘the first official United Stated expedition to explore Antarctica was led by Lieutenant
Charles Wilkes in 1838-1842. While searching for the south magnetic pole, Wilkes sailed
1,500 miles along the coast of east Antarctica that now bears his name, thus proving for
the first time that a continent-size land mass existed in the south polar region,’347

and that ‘Americans did not participate in the “heroic age” of European exploration.’348
However, submissions claim technological superiority, writing that
‘the United States pioneered the “technological age” of Antarctic exploration. Using
airplanes, radios and tracked vehicles, the Byrd expeditions of 1928-1929 and 1933-1935
discovered and surveyed vast areas of Antarctica, reported instantaneously by radio to an
excited public and staked claim to large areas on behalf of the United States.’349

Signatory states’ claims of discovery were contested in these debates, and Pakistan’s
submissions dispute this basis for sovereignty, stating that ‘the colonial premise on which
these claims were based has been rejected.’350 The submissions of the Philippines also call for
342
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a new agreement over the continent ‘which will not recognize territorial claims that are
substantiated by mere historical episodes.’351 This particular submission notes a Consultative
Party meeting on 23 September 1983 in Canberra, Australia, describing an aim of the
meeting as ‘to oppose attempts by third world countries to place Antarctica within United
Nations supervision.’352
Signatory states’ narratives of discovery both rely upon and legitimize a linear temporality.
The narrative tendency of international law as a teleology of progression has been well
documented.353 The relevance for my purposes of linking discovery with temporality is
partially how discovery is cast as legitimate claim to sovereignty, which defends terra nullius
as a concept. Indeed, Howkins describes how claims to Antarctica have been utilized by
states to project superiority ‘helping, they believed, to legitimise their rule both at home and
abroad.’354 Although discovery has been long invoked as an international legal claim,355 the
authorising function that it performs here is hybrid. It legitimizes discovery as a foundation
for claims of sovereignty and authority to govern Antarctica, and also other territory where
signatory states use the same claims. For instance, many territories that signatory states claim
as legitimately theirs are contested, such as settler colonies, although not confined to settler
colonial forms.356 As I will argue later in this chapter, the narrative or claim of discovery as a
legitimate form of sovereignty is also used to negate discussions of redistributing authority
through the concept of the common heritage of mankind.
Temporality as technology
Relating linear temporalities to extractivism as well as the forms of authority that narratives
of discovery exposed, I read signatory states invoking a linear temporality in both the
direction of the past and the future. This aspect of the question revealed that, in these debates,
the Antarctic continent is viewed by the signatory state actors that I focus on as a source of
future resources. The futurity of access to living and non-living resources plays an important
part in viewing multiple elements of Antarctic land as extractible. Australian representatives
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state their ‘commercial exploitation’ has been postponed due to the state’s ‘substantial
interest in ensuring that any exploitation of these resources by others is regulated … [to] not
threaten either the balance of the ecosystem or the maintenance of the resources for future
utilization.’357 Glacial ice is also identified as a resource, of water or for energy creation, to
be maintained for future use.358 Representatives of the Australian state describe a proposal in
these terms, ‘in the future, Antarctic icebergs may be towed to suitable northern sites (for
example, southern Australia) as a source of freshwater or to serve as a heat sink for energy
generation.’359 Additionally, the state posits this as a widespread technical solution, stating
that ‘as the demand for freshwater and new energy sources increases, it is likely that
Antarctic iceberg utilization will be seriously considered by a number of countries.’360
Past incarnations of extractive industry in Antarctica, such as during times of fur trade, are
also used by some signatory states as a basis for sovereignty claims. When invoking
discourses of exploration and discovery, extractivism is described as industrious, and leading
to occupation. Australian submissions state that ‘Cook… did discover several of the subAntarctic islands in the south Atlantic Ocean, and his reports of the teeming seal colonies
soon led to the establishment of the British southern sealing industry.’361 While Antonello
notes that the seal trade in Antarctic Islands in the early 1800s was a ‘catastrophic overexploitation,’362 the function of a linear temporality works to both legitimize and erase this
point, partially in order to maintain future claims to Antarctic resources. Motha’s work on
archiving as a narrative technology of simultaneously authorising and hiding is productive in
reading the relationship between this temporality and reasserting the legitimacy of the
distribution of authority in Antarctica.363 He writes that this narrative work can inaugurate
new forms of law and authority.364 A linear form of progress narrative working to authorize
the doctrine of discovery is notably reinforced by a number of signatory states who claim
territories of settler colonies.365
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The temporality relied upon is also homogenous, drawing a line from discovery to
sovereignty is necessarily linked to racialized discourses of civilization.366 As Mills states,
particular projections of abstract time work to reinforce a singular and racialized notion of
truth and authority.367 And Joyce has shown narratives of progress through homogenous time
to be deeply linked to authorization through international law.368 Linear temporality functions
then, in my reading, as a technology of authorization; one that that authorizes extractivism
and its own claim to authority at the same time. The temporality that seeks to legitimize
narratives of discovery operates to reinforce signatory states’ authority over Antarctica, but
this narrative also maintains international imperial ordering through reinforcing a narrative of
progress through homogenous time. This works to justify authority founded on ‘discovery’
and possession and project an idea that those foundations are both legitimate and no longer
relevant.369 This contradiction relies on both the linearity of the form of time constructed by
signatory states in these debates, as well as a notion of ‘progress’ that reconstrues possession
with a basis in extraction as sovereignty with a basis in discovery. In doing so, it reinforces
extractivism by locating the power to decide and profit in the North, including by working to
reinforce imperial spatial imaginaries.
Space-making as jurisdiction370
In this section I examine the way that contestations over the discourse of the common
heritage of mankind are utilized by the signatory state actors that I pay particular attention to
reproduce imperial divisions of space that also work to authorize extractivism beyond the
Antarctic continent.

Discourses of the common heritage of mankind
State actors contesting the Antarctic Treaty’s distribution of authority frequently invoked the
discourse of the common heritage of mankind. The concept of the common heritage of
mankind has been attributed to Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo who, in a 1967 speech to
the General Assembly, proposed a new regime to prevent powerful states from monopolizing
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deep sea resources.371 In the Antarctic debates, the discourse was invoked to promote
internationalizing Antarctic authority, as well as to counter colonialist extraction by
redistributing Antarctic resources and mobilizing them as a source of economic reordering.
For example, the submissions of Ghana noted an aim of the debates was ‘bringing Antarctica
eventually into a more open and accessible régime which would make it part of the common
heritage of mankind and not, as at present, the exclusive preserve of a limited number of
countries.’372 Challenges to the Treaty framework invoke the concept to be redistributive
explicitly in terms of resources, for instance Pakistan’s submissions state that ‘every State
should have a fair share of the living and mineral resources of Antarctica.’373 State actors also
identify the concept as a basis to advocate for access and distribution of scientific knowledge
drawn from Antarctica.374
The common heritage of mankind is itself a contested discourse with a complicated
relationship with extractivism. Scholars have examined the multiple meanings that the
discourse of the common heritage of mankind was given, particularly in the development of
international law of the sea and space.375 For my purposes, the sea and outer space are both
useful comparisons because of their constructions as remote, and as related through reference
to discourse of the common heritage of mankind. Karin Mickelson, writing to explore
multiple aspects of the principle in relation to its potential to slow environmental degradation,
notes certain mobilizations of the concept by the New International Economic Order that had
a ‘desire to emphasize the distributional aspects’ of the common heritage of mankind.376
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Ranganathan discusses the development of the law of the sea, specifically how conflict over
oceanic resources was expressed through discourses of the common heritage of mankind,
with varying interpretations between a ‘weak institution…guided by commercial
principles,’377 and a ‘strong international authority, in whose decision making they [nationstates from the global South who were invoking the concept] could effectively participate.’378
Craven also examines how a discourse of the commons could take on a more exclusionary
tenor in his analysis of Cold War powers’ contests over the legal developments to regulate or
aim to prohibit conflict and extraction in space. He writes that this particular formulation of
commonness attempted to avoid constructing outer space as a site of accumulation or war, yet
it reinforced both ‘rationalities’ through this formulation.379
The discourse was also utilized in competing ways in debates over Antarctica, exposing that
one element of what was at stake in debating authority and resource exploitation was
maintaining or reordering colonial imaginaries. Defences of the Treaty attempt to both
incorporate and control the use of the discourse (silencing its redistributive dimensions), as
well as reject its application. Simultaneously certain signatory state actors assert that the
common heritage of mankind is inappropriate in the Antarctic because of sovereignty claims
preserved by the Treaty.380 In arguing against its adoption, Australian submissions assert that
sovereignty claims mean applying the concept of common heritage to Antarctic territory is
implausible, stating in an earlier Forum that ‘unlike outer space and unlike the deep seabed,
where attempts are being made to apply new arrangements and concepts, Antarctica has been
the subject of exploration settlement and claims to sovereignty by a number of countries over
many years.’381 Representatives further assert that ‘for Australia and six other countries that
maintain national territorial claims and … national settlements, Antarctica is not beyond
national jurisdiction.’382 Also in these earlier forums, Argentinean representatives further
maintain that the idea of common heritage is inappropriate because ‘there is no legal vacuum.
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Nor is Antarctica a res nullius, on the contrary, there are various territorial claims to it.’383
This discourse also had antecedents, as a member of the United States Ocean Mining
Administration is described as ‘speaking in a personal capacity in 1977 at a press briefing
seminar,’384 stated:
‘Antarctica is not a no-man's-land… For a very long time, this continent has been a
sphere of political activity. Nations have, through forethought and initiative, developed
substantial vested interests in Antarctica's future. The political difference between the
deep seabed and Antarctica and between the moon and Antarctica is stated quite simply territorial sovereignty, and a sovereignty claim, be it valid, or dubious under international
law, is nonetheless the grist of the international law mill.’385

Whilst these state actors mobilize sovereignty claims to reject the emerging discourse, they
also appropriate the concept’s language to intervene in its definition and reinforce familiar
colonial concepts that locate humanity in the North. Australian submissions further locate the
ability to define the common heritage of mankind within the Treaty framework as it stands,
stating that ‘Consultative Parties, in dealing with the question of mineral resources in
Antarctica, should not prejudice the interests of all mankind in Antarctica.’386 Additionally, it
states that the Treaty ‘establishes Antarctica as a region of unparalleled international cooperation in the interests of all mankind.’387 In this way, these same actors also take the
position that the principles of the Treaty should be used in the interests of mankind,388
locating the ability to decide for mankind with themselves. Representatives for Sri Lanka
stated that ‘claims to serve the interest of all mankind necessitate further study of this matter
within the international community.’389 And as the submissions of Malaysia state, ‘the
interest of mankind can only be defined and managed by mankind itself… and not by any
country or group of countries.... The coincidence of the interest of mankind and the interest of
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the Consultative Parties is not inevitable or pre-ordained.’390 Representatives further stated
that
‘the assertion that the Treaty parties, in their current negotiations on a minerals regime,
act as trustees for mankind and will look after the interests of mankind does not carry
sufficient conviction … trustees cannot be self-appointed, and they should not have a
material interest in the trust property.’391

Peevers’ work on juridical theatre is a helpful way to read the contest over distinct
productions of legal authority.392 As Peevers writes, performances of juridical theatre are
plural, sometimes entailing a ‘crisis of meeting,’ for instance the signatory states’
manoeuvres to both limit and appropriate the discourse.393 In this way I do not read the
contest through this device to trace or argue that a particular vision became triumphant. I am
instead interested in tracing the narrative work, what Peevers calls scripts, that enables a
closer examination of the kinds of space and authority signatory states sought to eschew and
reproduce. Examining these narratives and performances helps, I suggest, to show how
certain signatory states sought to reaffirm imperial geographies, space and jurisdiction
through locating ‘common’ decision-making regarding ‘common’ resources squarely within
their authority. This does not require framing an idealized version of what the impacts of the
application of the common heritage of mankind would have been regarding extraction, but it
helps us see how negating redistribution works to reinforce distinctions of Northern access
and control of extractive processes. This reading assists in shifting the focus onto the multiple
productive dimensions of contests of authority and extractivism in Antarctica. The fact that
the doctrinal changes to the Treaty system’s distribution of authority have been limited does
not mean that the contest of meaning at this point in time has been definitively settled.
Indeed, such an understanding might point to ongoing contestation, linked through the ideas
of imperial geographies and the authority sought from space-making projects.
Imperial space
The spatial construction of Antarctica by signatory states can be read critically to reveal
attempts to reinforce and legitimize their authority over and beyond the continent. What is
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revealed when we think with a spatial approach to extractivist constructions of Antarctica, I
suggest, is a contest over imperial geographies and space-making that are entangled with
global patterns of extractivism as much as debating resource use in Antarctica. The specific
ways that I use a spatial lens is to engage the constitutive qualities of debates over the
common heritage of mankind. I argue that signatory states attempt to reassert a form of
imperial geography that reinforces global forms of authority to extract.
Barr has outlined how Antarctica as a southern continent has historically often been
constructed as a ‘counterbalance to the weight of the North.’394 She describes Antarctica as
‘an ambiguous place that is not-quite-land and not-quite-sea. Not quite either, its land is
covered by ice that moves and its seas freeze and expand and contract.’395 The idea of a
buffer or counterbalance is also expressed in through examining these debates. The
operativeness of this counterbalance works to preserve space or climactic stability in the
context of extractivism elsewhere. For instance, Australian representatives state that
‘resources may also include areas, species, biological communities or systems that are
considered important to maintain, protect or conserve in as unaltered a state as possible to
provide points of reference or natural buffers against activities undertaken elsewhere.’396
Craven highlights how a similar idea of a ‘spatial fix’397 influenced developing a legal
framework for outer space. The notion of a ‘spatial fix,’ developed by David Harvey,
describes imperialist responses to the ‘overaccumulation of capital,’398 or ‘capitalism’s
insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and
geographical restructuring.’399 Storr explains that
‘for Harvey, geographic expansion is an inevitable response to capital overaccumulation,
and functions as a ‘fix’ in two senses: first, as a solution to the irreconcilable co-existence
of surplus capital and labour; and second, as a mode of fixing or producing space, so that
capital can move freely within and across it.’400
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Spatial constructions of Antarctica can be understood then as expansionist as well as a form
of offset. Signatory states describe both a drive for resources as well as protection from
extraction, yet either way the space-making that they seek to maintain legitimizes global
forms of Northern authority and extractivism. Although Craven is interrogating a spatially
distinct site and during an earlier phase of the Cold War to the point at which these debates
occurred, the rationalities that he tracks in the development of the legal framework are
instructive. He shows that ‘a common theme is that impending resource depletion on earth
will soon bring such resources within commercial and technological reach, and that outer
space will therefore provide a spatial fix’ for a system of global capitalism that might
otherwise run into the ground.’401 The spatial fix is a helpful analytic, because it relies on a
homogenized vision of a single globe with extractive activity viewed or tallied in a single and
total way. This notion is related to the way the common heritage of mankind concept’s
redistributive dimension of commonality is appropriated by signatory states to position
themselves as the location of common humanity. Yet here, the way resources are positioned
as ‘commonly’ accessible within a single view works to position them in the control of
signatory states. Thinking about Antarctica in this way allows us to see that the imaginary of
its production and location as a source is not spatially confined to the Antarctic continent. I
suggest this account because the discussion of the technical capacity to engage in extractive
projects in Antarctica reference the accessibility of extractive projects elsewhere, in other
locations to which signatory states also assume access.
In a similar way, Mitchell has also shown how the use of geographical descriptions
naturalizes developmentalist interventions in Egypt. He explains, ‘what appears as nature is
already shaped by forms of power, technology, expertise, and privilege.’402 He describes the
way interventions, ‘solutions,’ are produced by naturalizing a particular view that suits the
intervention, ‘new technologies to overcome their natural limits… Yet the apparent
naturalness of the imagery is misleading.’403 For my purposes, the naturalness that I read as
being asserted is that signatory states have authority to decide on the extraction of resources
existing in anywhere in the globe, with this authority being framed as where it makes most
geographical sense, but leaving questions of whose territory it is and who will profit
comfortably out of view. For instance, submissions to the General Assembly state that ‘if
401
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sufficient incentive existed, exploitation of any Antarctic oil field could occur by sometime
after the turn of the century. At present, the technology exists to allow prospecting in most, if
not all, interesting offshore areas, and exploration in some limited areas.’404 Yet the
submissions continue to invoke both technical reasons and access to other resources as
reasons to postpone extracting Antarctic resources. Submissions state,
‘the remote and hostile environment, the difficulties and expense of extraction, the costs
of necessary environment protection and transport, and the availability of lower cost
alternative sources suggest that exploitation of Antarctic minerals is unlikely to be
technically feasible or economically rational until the next century, if ever.’405

Representatives additionally argue that ‘it has been suggested that manganese nodules, a
source of copper, nickel, manganese and cobalt, may have economic potential, though these
are most likely to be exploited first in tropical waters where they are richer and
geographically more accessible.’406 I suggest that the geographical discussion of technical
difficulties that would prevent Antarctic extraction both denote it as a site worth protecting,
and legitimize access to ‘easily’ accessible resources elsewhere as well as legitimizing
technology and ease of access as a way of ensuring authority over resources.407 Denoting
resources as ‘likely’ to be extracted or ‘accessible’ for extraction, as signatory states do,
assumes both access to and control over these resources. In this formulation, rightful
authority and ownership is located in the global North, reinforcing colonial binaries prevalent
in the authority claimed through both international law and extractivism. Although corporate
access for mining, drilling, fracking or similar extractive projects did not eventuate in
Antarctic territory, the background to the legal framework denoting ‘accessible’ resources
elsewhere reinforces signatory states’ and corporate access to these. As we will see in the
next chapter, this question is not separable from questions of the settler state, authority and
law.408 Gevers’ work on the productive dimension of imaginative geographies is a useful way
to understand signatory states’ narration of a singular global space where extraction can be
authorized and balanced without changing the structures of authority. The narrative of
404
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signatory states here works to produce a similar imaginary of space, a form of imperial
geography that reinforces imperial distributions of authority, harm and profit. This reading of
imaginaries produced through signatory states’ discourse attends to the construction of a form
of global extractivism that cannot be fully legible if these debates are considered only in
relation to the discrete site of Antarctica.
Much of my reading here also relies on how Craven explains Louis Althusser’s strategy of a
symptomatic reading, ‘not simply looking at a text for the purposes of determining what it
seeks to make clear or manifest but, rather, attending also to its constitutive silences … to
reveal what must be silently repressed, or kept out of sight in order for that which is visible to
have meaning.’409 Engaging this, the binaries implicit in creating imperial geographies
through space-making claims are also visible in the way Antarctica’s environmental
protection is later discussed in these debates. Australian submissions describe Antarctica as
wilderness and state that ‘wilderness has value to many people simply because they know it
is there.’410 The language of wilderness further naturalizes a binary between certain lands to
be protected, and lands where protection or restraint on extractive projects is not
contemplated – those lands where resources are flagged as prevalent or accessible. For
instance, as previous interventions by signatory state actors suggest, signatory states posit
scientific and climactic knowledge as a resource, even open space and wilderness is at times
also imagined as a source to draw from. The notion of a spatial fix here should be read in
conjunction with activities of some signatory states such as Australia that have heavily
extractive economies, relying both on internal contested territory and the resources of other
states by influential mining companies.411 For instance, Watson and other scholars have
shown the widespread theft of land as part of the colonial project and continuing extractivism
including fracking and, less conventionally considered extractive but with similar relationship
to land, disposal of nuclear waste.412 In this way I suggest that is not possible to fully
understand the implications for claims to authority and distribution of harm and benefit from
extractivism that are enacted in these debates solely by examining them as only impacting
Antarctic territory.
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To read in this way I also draw from Jasanoff’s work that shows the creation of space through
imaginaries can have a dispersed spatial effect, such as to ‘acquire governing force across
much wider domains, both physical and temporal,’413 including how ‘one can trace in policy
discourse the creation of new geopolitical boundaries.’414 These techniques and processes are
also visible in demarcating areas of legitimate state authority, and the spatial demarcation of
claims to authority over Antarctica may not be so easily separable from claims to authority in
other contested spaces. Jasanoff explains how binaries can operate in this dispersed spatial
way, ‘it takes power, as Foucault and other historians of the human sciences have long seen,
to create demarcations and simplifications in a world of hybridity.’415 Craven also finds in
relation to his examination of outer space that the ‘outward projection of a set of
rationalities’416 allowed state actors to, and this is particularly important for considering the
forms of extractivism authorized, ‘imagine the globe and situate themselves at its centre,
seeing themselves in, and through, where they were not.’417 The imperial vision of spacemaking that signatory states project in relation to extractivism then is inseparable from, or
works in a co-constitutive way with, a project of asserting settled authority where, in fact,
signatory states’ claims to authority are highly contested.
The work of jurisdiction as a technical or material practice that seeks to order authority helps
to interrogate the ways in which reasserting an imperial geography or concept of global space
can link extractivism and authority.418 Pasternak’s work on jurisdiction points to how
presenting a spatially unified claim to authority hides and ‘seek[s] to naturalize its spatial
differentiation.’419 In this way reassertions of imperial geographies can be read not only as
legitimating extractivist interventions but as using imperial constructions of space to
reinforce an imperial ordering of authority. Anghie, Pahuja and others have shown that the
work of binaries, such as those I argue are implicit in the imperial geographies invoked by
signatory states, are entangled with racialized discourses of civilization that were and remain
central to international legal ordering.420 Yet Pahuja’s work also shows how attending to
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these claims as jurisdictional practices can also denaturalize a claim to total authority,
because contest and plurality become more visible.421 The violence of constant reassertions
also then comes into view as signatory state actors actively work to maintain imperial space
and time and defend related forms of extractivism and authority.
Reading space-making technologies and imperial geographies as practices of authority with
material effect, and if, as I suggest, the Antarctic Treaty framework can be read as tied up
with these, a mining ban is a doctrinal change that does not necessarily undo all of the work
of authorizing extractivism that these debates point to. In fact, partially its effect is to
reinforce signatory states’ claims to have authority to extract beyond Antarctica. A spatial
lens further helps to see linkages between the temporal technologies also at work here.
Without a focus on the spatial dimension of the forms of extractivism seeking to be
authorized in these debates, and its dispersal well beyond Antarctic territory, it would be
easier to read doctrinal changes that occur throughout time as relegating all forms of
extractivism tied to Antarctica, and authorized in these debates, to the past. Instead, I suggest
that an account that highlights the contested authority and world-making practices within the
Antarctic Treaty exposes deep links to a project of maintaining divisions of authority,
imperial geography and control where extractivism is legitimized in the Northern taking of
Southern resources. Combining ideas of spatializing authority and extractive imaginaries
helps to see the ways that signatory states utilize and draw from Antarctica and how it is not
easy to clearly delineate this from extractive projects and assertions of authority elsewhere.
The analytic of extractivism then becomes entangled with other processes posited as spatially
or temporally distinct.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I read state submissions to the General Assembly’s 1984 consideration of
Antarctic authority and resources, being attentive to how signatory states defending the
Treaty characterized Antarctica and their relationship to the continent. Accounts of extraction
in Antarctica predominantly focus on doctrinal changes that ban mining and nuclear activity.
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To be clear, the importance of these is certainly significant.422 Yet considering the debates in
a different register, I suggested, reveals that Antarctica is constructed not only as a material
source to draw from (which may be abated by legislative bans), but also as an imaginary, a
source to draw from of a different kind. Changing the direction of our attention shows not
only how Antarctica receives and exposes the impacts of global extractive activity and the
fossil fuel economy, but also that the legal imaginaries of Antarctica contribute to the global
production of extractive activity. Specifically, imperial space-making practices seek to
maintain and reinaugurate a configuration of the world where humanity is located in the
global North and decisions on world resources can be made by Northern states, who assume
access to any location where resources are located. Discourses of geography work to
naturalize the access to resources outside Antarctic waters as easier to access than those
lodged under Antarctic ice sheets. These decisions, cast as purely technical, help to naturalize
forms of imperial geography and authority that suggest that the lack of material extraction
from Antarctic ice does not necessarily mean the forms of authority engendered by the
Antarctic Treaty are entirely separate from the material impacts of extractivism elsewhere. In
this way, I suggest that the debates can also be read to show the deep relationship between
legal imaginaries and material practices of law. A linear temporality further reinforces
narratives of progress and legitimizes the doctrine of discovery, which also relies on a
homogenized conception of space and governance. Constructions of homogenized space and
linear temporality here work together to reassert imperial ordering that is deeply entangled
with global extractivism. In this way, the international ordering visible in signatory states
discourse can also be read as reinforcing imperiality and claims to authority beyond Antarctic
territory. Holding this in mind, although conservation protocols are now in place that prevent
mineral and other material extraction from Antarctica, the global imperial imaginary within
the Treaty System preserves extractivism beyond Antarctic territory. In this way, I also argue
for a particular conception of extractivism,423 that paying attention to localized material
impacts of extractivism is essential, but there are other spatialized processes that also require
contestation. This conception of extractivism as spatially complex and at least partially
dispersed and entangled will become important when considering resistive possibilities to
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legal ordering that challenge the relationship between authority and extractivism exposed in
this chapter.

64

Chapter 3 – Movement, exchange and the rivers of the Murray-Darling
Introduction
In the last chapter I argued that focusing on doctrinal changes did not sufficiently counter the
extractivism authorized through a specific set of debates concerning authority over
Antarctica. This is because what was really at stake in those debates was a contest over a
temporality that authorized discovery as a legitimate mode of authority, and over imperial
geographies and space-making that reinforced Northern authority and extractive projects. In
this chapter I look at how regulation positioned as reducing extraction from the MurrayDarling river system in south-eastern Australia, including the ‘sustainable diversion limit,’424
reinforces extractive interventions towards the rivers. This is visible through examining
technologies of movement and exchange and how they have been utilized extractively to
strengthen state authority, as well as through histories of claims to divide the waters for
colonial projects. State control over the river system simultaneously unravels and is
reasserted, and state constructions of this river system produce claims to authority and
possession. This partly relies on overlapping forms of authority between state and corporate
actors in the river basin. I suggest that the impact of extractive projections towards these
waters is an attempt to transform existing legal relationships as a way of exerting authority
over land as much as for profit or a ‘productive’ outcome. I first look at stories of unravelling
and reasserting extractive control over the river basin, and then turn to how examining
material practices of movement as a technique of extraction and jurisdiction can help expose
the continuities in the extraction and the authority it generates. Looking at discourses of
sustainable diversion, in response to visible signs of extractivism, I argue that paying
attention to material practices is useful way to examine the interaction between extractivism
and authority here. Partly the specific ways in which the waters are used to assert territorial
authority depends on the extractive site’s construction as liquid. In conjunction with the
previous chapter, the ways that the co-constitution of extractivism and authority can be
understood in these two examples is both through imperial imaginaries that have material
effects, such as productions of imperial space and time that reinforce extractivism, and
material practices that build a colonial legal imaginary, such as practices of division and
exchange that assert the state’s lawful authority. In the last chapter, one particular reason to
pay attention to the imperial space-making and temporal techniques of constructing a global
424
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extractive imaginary was the material effects of this imaginary in sites where extraction was
authorized whilst extraction was prohibited in Antarctica. Here, we can see that one way to
track the construction of a colonial imaginary of legal authority in Australia is through
material practices of extracting water from the Murray-Darling. It is not that colonial
imaginaries of transforming land do not also affect the forms of material practices, certainly
this is also the case. But I suggest that through the practices themselves the colonial legality
and its imaginaries are performed, stabilized and recreated. In this way, the last chapter
showed how maintaining legal ordering authorized extractivism through a positioning of
common humanity in the North, and legitimizing discovery – in one sense, law that builds
extractivism. Here, material practices of extraction and allocation can also be shown to build
claims to authority and forms of law.
Unravelling and reasserting control
‘The word “rival” … [was] used in Roman law to mean those who shared the water of a
rivus, or irrigation channel.’425

The waters that form the area described as the Murray-Darling River Basin in south eastern
Australia stretch 77 000 kilometres.426 77 000 kilometres, that is, of water, or where water
used to be; the area covered by the Basin is over a million square kilometres,427 comprising
23 river valleys and over 30 000 wetlands.428 Substantial amounts of water are drawn from
the Basin, to drink, but also for the high concentration of agricultural industry in the area,
which includes significant food production and large-scale cotton farms.429 In 2012 a federal
management plan, the Murray Darling Basin Agreement, came into effect.430 Its purpose is
described as ‘to promote and co-ordinate effective planning and management for the
equitable, efficient and sustainable use of water and other natural resources.’431
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Striking images have brought attention to the Basin in recent years, including a mass of dead
fish floating in the Basin’s southern waters,432 algae, salinity and the river flows failing to
reach the sea.433 Stories from the Basin are equally striking: towns running out of drinking
water downstream, allegations of irrigators upstream stealing water with departmental
complicity, and irrigators being granted licences to harvest recent rains before they reach
towns downstream.434 Following a mass of fish dying in late 2019, fish were reported to be
electronically stunned and transported to a different water source as the Murray-Darling river
system could not support them to continue to live.435 At the same time, diesel pumps were set
up in the waters of the Darling river to attempt to oxygenate it artificially, since the low
oxygen levels in the water contributed to the mass death of fish that lived there.436
In a recent journalistic essay subtitled the ‘Tragedy of the Murray Darling,’ Margaret Simons
describes current water use in the southern Basin as a ‘plumbed landscape,’437 that in the
southern sections, ‘water is ordered up and delivered by rivers, pipes and channels to its end
use.’438 Yet in the Northern Basin, Simons writes, ‘the Authority estimates that up to 75 per
cent of the water diverted is unmetered.’439 The Australian Broadcasting Commission’s
program ‘Pumped’ shows footage of expansive private dams on cotton farms where meter
pumps appeared to not be working despite water appearing to be drawn from the river on
days of low flow.440 The extractive interventions towards this river system have caused
visible disruption to its health and life.
Describing interventions in the Basin, Simons states that ‘the water flows, usually, but the
information doesn’t.’441 Simons describes the inaccessibility and impenetrability of
432
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information about interventions into the Basin as exacerbated by bureaucratic management
and who she terms ‘water engineers,’ who, ‘since before federation, dominated irrigation –
the white man’s dream of creating gardens in the desert.’442 In this language of engineers,
rain is described as an ‘event,’443 regular parts of river flow, including evaporations or
seepage into the ground are described as ‘lost,’444 and if a river isn’t running, it isn’t ‘part of
the “connected’ system,’445 or is described as a ‘significant ‘cease to flow’ event.’446 The
Murray Darling Basin Agreement implements a ‘sustainable diversion limit’ to purportedly
reduce extraction, although without departing from an extractivist relation.447 The sustainable
diversion limit is required to be, but described as not being, based on what is described as an
‘environmentally sustainable level of take,’448 a related mechanism for measuring and
enabling specific amounts to be taken from ‘(a) the Basin water resources as a whole; and (b)
the water resources, or particular parts of the water resources, of each water resource plan
area.’449 A recent Royal Commission highlights deficiencies in scientific material relied upon
as well as an approach called the ‘triple bottom line,’ which enables consideration of
economic and social objectives along with environmental ones in determining these limits.450
Yet as Simons highlights, the sustainable diversion limit is ‘dead language, but also
confusing, even a lie, because the sustainable diversion limit is not sustainable, and may not
be a limit.’451 She describes how projects described as ‘efficiency schemes,’ may have meant
that irrigation draining has been changed to such an extent that water naturally returning to
the river through, for instance, dripping into the soil, has been lowered – potentially at
quantities that equal all of the water reallocated from farming to the river.452 Ironically, the
prevalence of the language of nature, as Simons says, is often used to legitimize further
interventions.453 The notion of water engineering and its discursive construction of the river
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as a resource reveals the deeply colonial projects of claiming and transforming land behind
extractive interventions in the Murray-Darling.
Simons also describes a departmental transition to ‘strategic’ water buy backs (water bought
from farmers’ licences by the government to return to the river for environmental purposes),
which meant a closed tender process.454 Indeed, in 2017, the Australian Department of
Agriculture was criticized for reportedly buying water at the value of $80 million from a
company with headquarters in the Cayman Islands with connections to a member of the party
serving in government.455 Simons describes complex systems of licencing with differing
entitlements of ‘security’ to extract water, and access to high or low water flows as well as
the ability to maintain an unused water entitlement for many years into the future.456 Water
licences used to be part of title to land, but law promoting trade has disconnected the water
rights from the property where the water is held.457 And the ownership of water is obscured,
with no public register of where each licence is held.458 Yet a report by the national weather
bureau for the year 2016-17 recorded 80% of entitlements to basin water by ‘individual users
(irrigation, industry and other uses), 2% for urban water use, and 18% for the
environment.’459 If the last paragraph began to reveal coloniality is linked to extractive
interventions here, the way water is posited as a tradeable commodity also draws attention to
relationships with systems of capital and exchange.
Although Simons has described the 2019 Royal Commission’s view that the Murray-Darling
Basin Authority, the federal body that governs the system, ‘is dishonest, incompetent and
acting outside the law,’460 I am particularly interested in the ways that this extractivism is
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coexisting, or produced by – inside, in a way – the law. To do this I look at how the multiple
extractions from the waters of the Murray-Darling have been used to bolster contingent and
unstable claims to state authority and possession through technologies of movement and
exchange.
Technologies of movement, division and exchange
Barr’s examination of movement as a form of jurisdiction, particularly attending to AngloAustralian common law, is helpful to disrupt the common law’s, or colonial state law’s,
imaginary of stasis, certainty and completeness.461 Her work on movement as jurisdictional
technique focuses primarily on how the movement of people is implicated in moving laws of
Empire.462 I take up the analytic of movement with a slightly different focus, how colonial
histories of extractive interventions towards the river show sustained moving, dividing, and
exchange of the water. This becomes particularly relevant for examining recent initiatives
such as the ‘sustainable diversion limit,’ which purport to limit extraction. Yet, techniques of
moving and dividing water allowances seem more continuous than discontinuous with
practices long associated with extractivism toward the river. Moreover, the techniques of
metering at least partially locate rightful ownership of water (through licences and other
mechanisms) with corporate irrigators, and entirely within the framework of the colonial state
law. I also argue, drawing from Barr’s work, that not only do techniques of metering and
exchange sustain extractive practices, but also are a way to assert legal authority and control,
with reassertions of control heightening as control unravels. In this way, for my purposes,
movement as a technical practice of law is a helpful analytic because it exposes the
implications of moving, exchanging, measuring and dividing the waters of the MurrayDarling, as attempting to assert complete legal control over the multiple contested First
Nations territories that the basin spans. While techniques of movement and exchange help to
disrupt the state’s projection of stable, singular legal and territorial authority in this case,463
the sustaining dynamics of relationships between authority and extractivism are not confined
to these techniques.
One of the implications or visible instances of the techniques of movement used in extractive
interventions towards this river system is to create dams and allowances and meter its flow,
461
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to divert water into storage, to return water from licences to the river itself. Indeed
historically, the technique moved water between jurisdictions, for instance partly as agreed
on in a colonial pact that certain state bodies are entitled to certain amounts of water for their
interests and use. Sandford Clark describes Victoria and New South Wales’ agreement in
1886 to ‘divide the waters between them.’464 Colonies, and then federal states (New South
Wales, Victoria, South Australia), constructed the river as parcels of productive water,
constructing rights to divert and utilize the water for irrigation and navigation.465 The recent
report of the South Australian Royal Commission into the Murray-Darling Basin frames New
South Wales’ claims as ‘territorial rights to the watercourses,’ Victoria’s claims as irrigators’
rights, and South Australia’s claim as ‘concern to preserve flows for the purposes of
navigation.’466 Simons also describes the Murray-Darling as one of the ‘most bitterly
contested issues,’ in debates about creating the Australian Constitution, which has resulted in
power to regulate river water firmly outside the Commonwealth, with states alone.467 The
Commissioner highlights the multiple meanings of conservation and regulation toward the
river,468 revealing further exchange and movement of water. He distinguishes what he calls a
20th Century meaning of conservation as environmental protection and a ‘19th Century
Anglophone use’ as ‘the storage of water from otherwise natural flows, in order to make it
available later, as desired by (say) irrigators.’469 Indeed he says these conservations efforts
were intended to ‘enable regions otherwise too arid to farm … to bear more profitable crops,
and denser settlement to take root.’470 Indeed the early views of colonists are evidenced in
certain descriptions of the tributary Murrumbidgee River as dry, ‘useless for any purposes of
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colonization.’471 And First Nations have recently described the actions taken toward the area
as constituting practices of a form of ‘aqua nullius.’472
Moving the Basin waters for production as a state resource both compiles the waters together
and divides them into sections. The complex life of the river basin has been metered, divided,
extracted, returned (from irrigation licences, where in the state legal imaginary ownership is
rightfully located, at least partially). Yet the dead fish, algae and salinity, as evidence of state
interventions, both show control and a lack of control. Movement itself connotes a tension
between projections of control and the inability to control. The moving of the water, and the
returning it back, signifies control but also exposes instability of the many corporate and state
actors along the river and their claims to legal authority. Movement is also used to flush salt
from the river so as to not affect farming salinity,473 and to maintain irrigation; it shows the
repetition of efforts at control, including how they change over time. Indeed, Sue Jackson and
Lesley Head write about the way water has been moved to such an extent through
heightening neoliberal positionings that it became known as ‘exchange water.’474 They write
how ‘scripting water as a transferable ‘unit’ represented a further step in the abstraction of
modern water, this time through an act of spatial abstraction that made water fungible.’475
They link this to projects of knowledge of the water and quantifying its flow that were central
to conceptualising it as a resource for the settler colony.476 Indeed, more recently, there has
been pressure to increase the amount enabled under the sustainable diversion limit.477
Legislation permits proposed adjustments, under five percent of the total water volume, in the
instance of, as examples: ‘re-configuring suitable lakes or storage systems to reduce
evaporation’478 or ‘changing the methods of environmental watering in such a way that
equivalent environmental outcomes can be achieved with a smaller quantity of water.’479
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Heather Downey and Tim Cluney also describe governmentality and neoliberalism enacted
through claims to water entitlement in the Murray-Darling.480 Invoking governmentality and
discourse analysis, the moveability, engagement and constitutive nature of discourse and
social relationships,481 they specifically look at ‘irrigators’’ imagined or assumed sense of
entitlement to water.’482 Revealingly, they argue that the former Minister for Agriculture
‘perpetuates mythologised notions that water in the MDB belongs to irrigators alone.’483 His
reported response to allegations of water theft was to frame a discussion on water
entitlements ‘‘about them trying to take water off you,’’ which locates rightful ownership of
the waters with irrigators and posits its rightful use as a resource.484 The neoliberal
governmentality of water marketization is a different form of division and exchange than the
division between colonial states, with a different relation to the colonial state law. Yet they
are not unrelated, and the remedy to extractivism is often posited as better regulation by the
state.485 Without saying that limiting extraction is insignificant, proposing more regulation by
the state misses how the state’s authority is necessarily entangled with corporate authority
and capital, as well as how this proposal entails an implicit assumption that the state’s law is
the only proper law governing the Murray-Darling. Yet it is important to draw out, rather
than obscure, the implications of the assertion of colonial law and how it works in close
relationship with capital and corporate authority. Indeed, Scott shows how the Canadian
settler state provides access to capital in an attempt to preserve its own position, ‘to delay the
inevitable breakdown of the state’s jurisdictional authority on those lands, which will entail
radical wealth redistribution from capital to Indigenous peoples.’486 She draws from A. Claire
Cutler’s work, highlighting that ‘“the assumption of the apolitical nature of private/economic
exchanges ignores the more generalized and public implications of these exchanges,”’487 yet
Scott argues that, fundamentally ‘this is a struggle for the control of lands and resources.’488
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Further, rendering the river as a non-living resource further works to make commodifying it
more legible.489 Yusoff also argues that particular knowledges and technologies work to
increase the legibility of extractive projects,490 by ‘the collective functioning of geologic
languages coded—inhuman, property, value, possession.’491 For the waters of the MurrayDarling, the Commission traces the predominance of economic language in positioning the
river as a resource in current government descriptions.492 He describes ‘the very unhelpful
slogan of a ‘triple bottom line,’’ which posits the rivers as a resource to be extracted for
economic and social gain, with metered ‘recovered’ water for stated environmental
purposes.493 However, the balancing of these objectives through legislation sounds
reminiscent of the form of conservation mentioned above, maintaining the lowest possible
level of environmental protection in order to keep the river functioning for future
extractions.494 Any ‘incommensurab[ility]’ between the health of the water and its
construction as a productive resource is eliminated through this slogan,495 and irrigation
remains privileged.496 Yusoff also explains the importance of describing geologic processes
not as natural but to expose the work that this knowledge does ‘as a question about the
asymmetric organization, the capitalization, the temporal conversions and contraction of…
inhuman matter and force.’497 The way legal and physical interventions relatedly participate
in this organization can be seen through the persistence of regulation of the river through
construction to manipulate its flow.498 Yusoff encourages attending to ways in which the
‘ontological categorization of matter is used to do political work,’499 and also shows the
interrelated sociality of extractive processes, arguing that the construction of ‘the earth as
dead matter,’500 has strong implications for extractive relationships. Sharp expansion in
extractivism are certainly visible, and the Commission describes dams, such as the curiously
489
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named ‘Keepit Dam,’ contributions to cotton production; in just five years (1961-1969), the
area for growing cotton expanded from 38 hectares to 20 000 hectares.501 The interaction
between disruptions described as natural, usually described as drought rather than the
interaction of extraction and drought, can work to invisiblize the role of extractivism. For
example, between 2001 and 2009 during a significant drought, the river flow dropped by
82%. Half of this reduction in flow, the Commission states, was a result of extraction.502 The
influence of coloniality and capital on extractive interventions in the Murray-Darling then
also begins to reveal the centrality of law to these projects, including the use of this river
system to assert control and authority of the settler state’s law.
Barr’s work highlights how law’s projections of completeness, or of being ‘everywhere,’
seeks to erase First Nations’ legal authority503 and at the same time obscures how movement
itself can be a colonial technique.504 The rivers of course move of their own accord, and this
movement coexists with the movements different actors utilize to fulfil their desired uses of
the rivers.505 Constructions of the Murray-Darling Basin river system produce claims by the
Australia state to authority and possession.506 Moreton-Robinson’s work on ‘possessive
logics,’ is useful in drawing out the extent to which competing and fragile claims of authority
and possession to the waters of the Murray-Darling Basin must be constantly reasserted.507
She describes possessive logics as ‘a mode of rationalization… that is underpinned by an
excessive desire to invest in reproducing and reaffirming the nation-state’s ownership,
control, and domination.’508 And the Murray River has long been a site of colonial
interruption and contest. Contests between colonial states exposed a shared view of the river
as a resource to fuel expansion and authority over land and waters. The Commission links the
current extraction from the Basin to ‘vain searches [by colonists] for the putative great inland
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sea.’509 The Commission’s report describes extractivism historically and continually, locating
‘irreversible alteration in the Basin water resources’ in the 1800s.510 Disputes and displays of
ownership between colonial states serve to show an extractive positioning of water, being
able to be divided, commodified and put to work.511 Yet framing the contest as only between
colonial states alone would obscure the dispute between colonial laws and First Nations’
laws, jurisdiction and authority. Indeed Moreton-Robinson highlights the interrelation
between invasion of lands and waters and the production of a colonial racialized social space.
She describes how ‘racism is … inextricably tied to the theft and appropriation of Indigenous
lands in the first world.’512 Theft and extractivism are not the same process, although they are
related in a settler colony. Exposing the relationships between coloniality and intrusion into
or extraction from the river, the Commission report describes colonial attitudes to the water,
constructed as valuable or difficult: ‘used as a ‘servant’ or resisted as an ‘enemy.’’513 The
Commission also characterizes extractive interventions and practices as (I would say
attempting to) ‘ordain their own (relative) permanence.’514 The specific movement and
exchange of the waters of the Murray Darling, and related reassertions and unravelling of
claims to authority and control, expose how extractive interventions towards these waters are
also used to consolidate authority over contested land and territory. In this way, relating to
the reassertions of settler colonial authority, elements of the Murray-Darling discourse and
water are moved and disrupted, but also continuous in their adaptive and violent
reassertion.515
This far I have suggested that techniques of movement, division and exchange are utilized by
the state to assert lawful authority and control over the rivers of the Murray-Darling. There
were certain continuities that I read between techniques of movement and division in
historical agreements to allocate water between state governments and more recent discourse
509
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that purports to regulate extraction by irrigators through similar state allocations, as well as a
more mercantile approach to water exchange. I argued that as well as enabling continued
extraction, the techniques of moving also show attempts to assert that the state’s law is the
proper law in control of the river system, even as visible signs of the river’s ill-health suggest
that control is unstable. The implications of paying attention to these techniques of movement
as a jurisdictional practice has so far been to expose the state’s claims to rightful authority.
These are also relevant for examining the constitutive connection between extractivism and
authority, which, in this thesis, includes the way that the material practices of movement
build a colonial legal imaginary. For instance, in the previous chapter I argued imperial
spatial and temporal imaginaries were not disconnected from authorizing material practices
of extractivism beyond Antarctica: the legal ordering reproduced extractivism. I now look at
how material practices of extraction themselves are used to build colonial law and an
imaginary of authority that extends beyond the site of extraction.
Material practices building a colonial legal imaginary
Material distribution is a crucial element of claims to authority in settler colonies. Adrian
Smith’s explanation of a ‘material legality’516 is helpful to draw out the importance of what
he terms, ‘socio-spatial practices’517 and the ‘material processes, practices, relations, and
conditions of settler colonial capitalism.’518 It is important not to minimize materiality, he
argues, as settler colonialism is ‘a (trans)formative structural relationship of domination and
authority expressed in national-territorial terms… it functions on an obfuscation of its
necessarily violent means carried out to secure and enforce authority.’519 His argument is
based in writing about labour and the racialized impacts of agricultural extractivism, and he
highlights, ‘work, labour, and the capital relation matter to how we characterize settler
colonialism.’520 I use the concept of ‘material legality’ to examine different material practices
as this thesis is not an account of labour in extractivism, or in the Murray-Darling region, yet
certainly no to deny its fundamental operativity.521 The way that I engage material legality
here is based on Smith’s insight that ‘territoriality is not a thing but rather an actionable
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spatial and legal claim of authority set within the relations of private property.’522 What is
also visible through an analysis of material practices is the centrality of capital to colonial
legal imaginaries.523 I do not adopt a simplistic division between the state’s legal imaginary
and corporate practices of extraction, there is significant co-constitution between them. The
practices that build assertions of law in my reading are drawn both from Smith’s work on
material legality and Barr’s work on material practices of movement as jurisdiction, where
paying attention to practices of dividing the waters of the river system also reveal practices of
colonial legality. Material practices of water division (even if they are enacted or visible
through discourse and legislative agreement) themselves build a colonial legality that is
spatially dispersed and temporally continuous. This is because extractive practices actively
utilize the river system to, historically and continually, claim and attempt to transform lands
in the Murray-Darling region. Additionally, extractive practices posit the water as a divisible
resources between colonial states and irrigators, and corporate capital with which the state
has overlapping webs of authority.524 This utilization for transforming or claiming land is
deeply linked to projecting the authority of the colonial state’s law, to the exclusion of all
other legal systems. In a certain way then, material practices contribute to creating a legal
imaginary.
Partially, the specific way that the material practices operate in this site depends on its
liquidity. Barr argues that the common law imaginary is strongly linked to, ‘attaching to,’
land.525 Spaces constructed as distinct to land, including waters, are involved in attempting to
bolster extractivism and authority, including over land (to the extent that land and waters can
be entirely separate categories).526 And specific colonial imaginaries of land and territoriality
have been central to claiming property and authority in settler colonies.527 It is also the case
that space constructed as ‘otherwise’, such as outer space, and I suggested Antarctic ice, is
involved in a distinct but related way to these territorial claims of authority (and totality).
This is partly due to how the idea of a ‘spatial fix’ perpetuates and obscures other extractive
activity, or works as an extension and demonstration of control.528 To further consolidate a
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reading of the relationship between possession and extractivism with positing the moveability
of water, I also engage with Yusoff’s description of power distribution and organizing space,
particularly her argument that ‘politics takes place in relation to an inhuman ‘outside.’’529
Indeed, in this instance, a rendering of the river as non-living resource works to make
commodifying it more legible. Partly, I suggested in the previous chapter, it is part of
constructing the imperial spatiality and temporality of a global extractivism. Here, there is
something spatially distinct about the construction of extractivism. The specific way that this
river system has been posited as a colonial resource also depends in part on its liquidity;
water is used in part to change the land and the profits drawn from it. Water is utilized to
transform land, in a way typical of colonial projects,530 but the imaginary it builds can be
mobilized by the state to assert a broader control over territory beyond the Murray-Darling.
Extracted water is used for the land around it, and it is also then mobilized to build and
legitimize the colonial state’s asserted lawful presence. Yet, liquidity and movement both
reinforce and destabilize claims to territorial authority, as its dual signification also reveals
how the state’s claims to complete legal authority cannot be maintained in a totalizing way.
In the next chapter I elaborate more on the specific nature of liquidity, and the implications
for framing resource extraction and contested authority over land.
Conclusion
Looking at discourses of sustainable diversion, in response to visible signs of ecological
stress, I argued that paying attention to material practices reveals the interaction between
extractivism and authority in this case. Through looking at instances of extractive
interventions by the Australian state towards the Murray-Darling River Basin as a resource, I
suggested that positing this river system as moveable, divisible and exchangeable does not
depart from the sustaining dynamics of the interventions that positioned the rivers as an
extractive site initially. This is because they are utilized to produce claims to authority and
possession. I also suggested that techniques of movement are both utilized to place the state’s
law and exert control over the waters of these rivers, but also movement shows that control
cannot be certain or complete. Partly the specific ways in which the waters are used to assert
territorial authority depends on the extractive site’s posited liquidity, which I turn to in the
next chapter. In conjunction with the previous chapter then, the ways that the co-constitution
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of extractivism and authority can be understood in these two examples is both through
imperial imaginaries that create material effects, and material practices that are utilized in
building a colonial legal imaginary. In the next chapter, I look at the implications of the
techniques I examined in this chapter, and the chapter concerning Antarctica, for the
relationship between extractive projects and how they have been used to generate and sustain
(unstable) claims to authority.
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Chapter 4 – Unstable Authority
This thesis concerns the margins of extractive authorization partly because extractivism is not
explicitly justified in the sites that I look at. Yet it also concerns the margins of the territorial
nature of authority because it concerns spaces constructed as ‘otherwise’ including rivers and
ice (which is reliant on colonial epistemologies of what land is).531 Both the significant
material violence and the significantly violent imaginaries of extractivism are contested.
While attending to technologies of space-making, temporality and movement help to make
more visible both the continuity of extractive violence and its incompleteness – these
practices and the epistemologies underlying them are themselves in flux. The impossibility
and violence of projecting a singular law is an irresolvable problem in claims to authority or
extraction that rely on legal coherence and universality.532 The previous chapters have
focused on how techniques of reinforcing global extractivism involve legal ordering that is
prevalent even when extraction is not explicitly present, as well as how the same legal
ordering and forms of extractivism are used to generate or project claims to authority. This
brief chapter looks at the instability, or liquidity, of that authority and its implication for how
extractive positioning of resources as separate from the land can obscure extractivism’s
fundamental relationship to territorial authority.
This far I have argued that understanding extractivism requires consideration of racial
capitalism, imperialism and settler colonialism. Understanding both the violent and unstable
nature of claims to authority, and their relationship to extractivism, I have engaged the work
of jurisdiction in order to expose contested practices of asserting legal authority. Reading
both chapters together tends towards understanding law’s production of extractivism as
spatially dispersed. While many explicitly violent instances of extractivism are legitimized
and justified through legal ordering, specific forms of law also reinforce extractivism more
implicitly. In the chapter on certain debates over Antarctica, a spatially confined mining ban
that is to come co-exists with imperial spatial production that contributes to forms of global
extractivism that naturalize Northern ownership and benefit from Southern resources. As
space and time cannot be entirely separated as analytical frames,533 the work of a
homogenized, linear temporality or a narrative of progression also contributed to locating
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rightful legal authority (and consequent extractivist decision-making) in imperial
configurations. Paying attention to the specificity of localized struggles is essential, and I
certainly do not adopt a flat universalized view of global space,534 but rather point to spatially
dispersed forms of extractivism and authority being re-enacted through these debates. This
would enable considering challenges to imperial legal ordering as possibilities for resisting
this authorization alongside site-specific struggles. Similarly, in the Murray-Darling,
techniques of dividing and exchanging as asserting lawful authority and control over the
waters as a state resource not only works to reinforce extraction from the Basin river system.
Additionally, these material practices are part of building a colonial legality, and the colonial
state’s legal imaginary of a singular law is asserted over space beyond the river system.
Challenges to the colonial state’s lawful authority expose the violence and impossibility of
these claims to legal totality in a related way to challenges to the ongoing extraction from the
rivers.
Because of the broader ordering involved in law’s structuring of extractivism, resistive
possibilities inherent in law’s liquidity challenge legal ordering in a number of ways, through
direct opposition to extractive projects, through challenging the imperial extractive ordering
of legal narratives or through challenging the place of the colonial state’s law or international
law’s ordering. I briefly describe two instances of such challenges here. As these artistic
projects have multiple communicative functions, I do not describe them to produce an
account of or about the projects themselves, but rather to read them as part of multiple legal
assertions and orderings and point to them as forms of resistance beyond doctrinal change
that work on either an imaginative or material level to challenge the spatialized
imperialism/coloniality of the authority-extractivism relationship. One such project is a
challenge to extractivism in the Murray-Darling waters in a recent exhibition by multiple
artists titled ‘River on the Brink.’535 While this exhibition speaks to localized impacts of
extractivism, it can also challenge more broadly the extractive ordering and material practices
of constructing colonial law in the region.
Challenging global extractive positioning of territories in the global South, Colombian artist
Carolina Caycedo’s work is described by Gómez-Barris as disrupting the ‘extractive view’ of
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surveillance images taken for a hydroelectric project in the Magdalena River.536 GómezBarris shows how ‘rather than reproduce the extractive view that sees like a satellite from
above to enable the management and diversion of the river’s resources toward capitalist
accumulation,’537 Caycedo’s work ‘reverses the flow of capital and its amnesic evacuation of
what was once there, placing the river back in the frame and outside of the digital colony.’538
Gómez-Barris writes, ‘because of its sheer size and potential for destruction, mega dam
development often casts doubt about the potential for local responses, yet … visual and
embodied resistance finds ways to fissure the dam walls, working to perforate the matrix of
capitalist expansion.’539 The implications of this, as Gómez-Barris highlights, are, ‘Caycedo
produced a fish-eye epistemology that changes how we might relate to Yuma [the river] as a
sentient being, rather than as an extractible commodity.’540 This work, while spatially distinct
from either site also participates in challenging a global extractive ordering, where an
homogenized global space, similar to a satellite view, is reminiscent of the Antarctic
signatory states positioning global resources as under their control.
If legal imaginaries and material practices of legality influenced each other in the
imperial/colonial construction of an authority-extractivism relationship, resistance in both of
these registers can impact this reproduction. To be able to make this analysis, the frames of
the imaginary and the material have to be able to be read as impacting each other. For
instance, exploring the imaginaries of narrative work and their links to materiality, Kojo
Koram writes about Fanon’s intellectual resources for critical legal work. Koram writes,
‘Fanon’s work did not dismiss or deemphasize the way the material relations of production
underwrote colonial ordering, but neither did he simply reduce racial subjectivization to a
manifestation of structural economic relations.’541 He shows how Fanon’s account exposes
how the ‘anchoring of Euro-modernity in the subjugation of the colonized subject can be seen
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to also facilitate the transition of the Euro-modern perspective into a self-acclaimed position
of not only universality but also omnipotence.’542 Reading measures to sustainably divert the
Murray-Darling and Antarctic mining debates in this context would reveal not merely
legitimizing extractivism or practices that enable it elsewhere, but claims to legal supremacy.
In Antarctica, contests to legitimize the doctrine of discovery, imperial control and racialized
ordering through projections of space and time overlapped with legitimizing and continuing
extractivist ordering that enables taking and intervention by the global North. As we saw in
the Murray-Darling, the claim is to the legitimacy, place and authority of state law. In the
face of resistance and contradictory incompleteness, state law’s authority is constantly retold
in a similar way to the reoccurring practices that attempt to reassert control over the river
itself, visible through how law structures interventions. Resistive possibilities and violent
reassertions co-exist, with significant material consequences.543 For instance, Gevers’ work
on imaginative geography shows that the space-making techniques of imperialism and
colonialism are themselves contested.544 Indeed, Gómez-Barris argues, ‘if we only track the
purview of power’s destruction and death force, we are forever analytically imprisoned to
reproducing a totalizing viewpoint that ignores life that is unbridled and finds forms of
resisting and living alternatively.’545 Gómez-Barris also draws from Du Bois’ ‘form of
multidirectional critique that both undoes and reworks unilinear historical narratives that
erase its subjects,’ as ‘multivalent’ and an ‘episteme of double consciousness.’546 Work on
resistive possibilities through countering and thinking beyond provides insight into the
multiple and shifting effects of the colonial legal order, both material and imaginative, as
well as its limits. This point is not to deny that there is any importance to a mining ban or
initiatives to reduce extraction, but not to negate the continuity of extractive authority that
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may also be enacted through these doctrinal changes, or to confine resistive possibilities to
these.
In conceptualizing resistive possibilities, it is useful to have an account of the notion of
liquidity in two respects, firstly as it helped to trace the specific ways extractivism is
authorized through assertions over places not posited as solid land in colonial epistemologies,
and now to assist with getting closer to a sense of the instability of these reassertions of
authority. I speak about laws as liquid not only because the extractive projects I examine
occur on surfaces not constructed completely as solid land; the colonial legal imaginary is
distinct, although related to imaginaries of land. I suggest that it is also the case that these
laws are liquid because the authority sought to be claimed is moveable, traceable, but not
permanent, although reoccurring. I refer to liquid laws then, both for their movement and
because they are reasserted, as well as for the way they are related to land in colonial
epistemologies.547 The spatial construction of Antarctica as remote, between water and
land,548 but confined or ‘fixed’549 is distinct to the waters of the Murray-Darling as divisible
and exchangeable. Yet, in contrast to a projection of static, singular territorial authority,550 the
examples here expose how the forms of authority tied up with extractivism in these cases are
contested and unstable. The idea of liquidity, both as instability and as a particular spatial
construction, is one way to see what can also be revealed by land-based struggles over
resources, that positioning resources as separate, and removeable, from the land (attempts to)
obscure the ways in which extractivism is fundamentally related to claims to territorial
authority.551
There are many ways in which settler-colonial and international law facilitate extractivism
and expansion whilst constantly justifying their grounds, albeit in unstable or uncontainable
ways.552 Much has been written about how claims to space, territory or land with legal
techniques (and the violence this entails) is incomplete and unstable; overlapping narratives
must be constantly retold and reformed in the face of resistance to these claims.553 In these
547
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discussions of narrative I have referred to state or international law, although multiple legal
orders are central to disruption, resistance and the instability of legal narration.554 One way
that I have suggested that these forms of law perform responses to groundlessness is by
creating a knowledge base.555 Narratives are used not only to re-establish corporate
relationships and access to extractive practices, or to project authority over natural resources
in the region, but also to further settler colonial projects and assert the stability of a legal
position over contested space.556 As Pasternak and Scott note, ‘Canada’s claim to exclusive
territorial authority across all the lands and waters is a failed project.’557 They continue, ‘but
that fact has only succeeded in more complex legal and political subterfuge,’ detailing
‘tactics of the settler capitalist state, and on the exercises of Indigenous jurisdiction that
counter them.’558
The other valence of liquidity connotes the movement of water, or the shifting of ice.559
Mawani explains that there are ‘many sites of territoriality where struggles over colonial and
imperial rule were waged,’560 ‘despite the prevalence of modernist and imperialist land-based
legal imaginaries, oceans featured prominently and even significantly as topographies of
colonial and settler colonial legalities.’561 Focusing on spaces that are ‘outside’ or ‘otherwise’
to land-based territory is partly to highlight the forms of authority being asserted over land as
well. Signatory states, in the Antarctic debates, both authorize global extractivism through
reinforcing the temporality of the doctrine of discovery and imperial space, as well as
generating or stabilizing claims of authority that reinforce signatory states own positions with
a global imperial order, or over claimed colonial territory, or both.562 In the Murray-Darling,
techniques of moving and exchanging the river not only perpetuate the river as an extractive
site, but also continue to (seek to) place the law of the colonial state in control of the river
and its surrounds.563 In the Murray-Darling, controlling interventions visibly unravel as
attempts to control the river produce stark algal blooms, dry riverbeds and dead fish.

554

See for example Birrell, supra note 17. See also Watson, supra note 48; Margaret Davies, Law unlimited:
materialism, pluralism, and legal theory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). On artistic forms of resistance, and how
these might also assist with conceptualizations of extractivism, see Gómez-Barris, supra note 104.
555
Mawani, supra note 185.
556
See Buchanan and Johnson, supra note 45.
557
Pasternak and Scott, supra note 29 at 205. Although of course differing tactics and situations apply.
558
Ibid.
559
See Barr, supra note 11, on Antarctic ice being construed as ‘not-quite-land’ at 197.
560
Mawani, supra note 49 at 125.
561
Ibid.
562
See Anghie, supra note 13.
563
See Barr on the placing of law, supra note 11; 15.

86

Movement not only commodifies the river as a resource to reinforce extractivism, but to
position the colonial state’s law as the only legitimate authority over the river. The imperial
space reinforced by Antarctic signatory states is contested in multiple ways. Imperial spacemaking and temporalities do not only enable extraction and profit, but also continue the
imperial ordering of authority. If technologies and engaging history helped to show that law
does more extractive ordering than is always stated, these forms also produce authority and
are then also contested.564 The work of narrative helps to show both the violence and
impossibility at the heart of these claims to authority, and to see resistive possibilities.
The way imperial space-making and linear temporalities work together to reinforce global
extractivism helps to reveal the spatial production of global extractivism, or extractivism in
the projects of a nation-state. The spatial configurations have material effects, and material
bases. The interaction of the imaginary and the material helps see the complicated ways that
extractive ordering is reproduced and contested, including the temporal construction of a
linear homogenous time where extraction is used as a basis for legitimate possession, and
current extractions are posited a being regulated. These multiple registers are also visible in
the work of resistive possibilities. Reading in this way does not erase the territoriality of
extractivism and colonial claims to lawful authority; indeed territoriality is key to both,
particularly in the specific ways the spatial construction of both relates to and obscures
contested claims to territory. These claims rely both on transcendent claims to authority and
material practices of jurisdiction or legality that have distinct but related ways of reinforcing
extractivism.
This chapter examined the instability, or liquidity, of claims to authority in the context of
extractivism. I have suggested that law structures extractivism implicitly as well as explicitly
due to imperial space-time,565 and technologies of division. Additionally and relatedly,
extractivism generates authority by the same mechanisms and techniques. The enactment of
this in the examples I have looked at involves the interlinked workings of legal imaginaries
and material practices of law-making. Imaginaries and technologies of jurisdiction have
material consequences that are spatially dispersed from the site in question, and material
techniques generate law and contribute to imaginary: the co-constitution of both of these is a
564
565
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crucial element of the authority-extractivism relationship I have sketched out here. This
relationship specifically works here in double context of imperial/colonial violence, and of
spatial construction with specific relationship to territorial authority. Specifically, whilst
resources are constructed as removeable commodities, paying close attention reveals the deep
links between extractivism and claims to authority over certain territories.566 There is
particular violence in this, as well as strong possibilities for resistance inherent in law’s
liquidity because extractivism is both explicitly and implicitly tied to the ordering of
authority more broadly. Consequently, then, a broad range of resistive possibilities can
challenge its totality, not just doctrinal changes but any of the multiple challenges to these
forms of legal ordering. The resistive possibilities inherent in law’s liquidity draw out both
the violence and impossibility of completeness or stasis in the authority-extractivism
relationship, and multiple challenges to ordering of extractivism and authority in both
material and imaginative registers expose more than contestation but multiple possibilities of
re-ordering.
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Conclusion
Examining the authority-extractivism relationship as co-constituted reveals that extractivism
is both a claim to authority and used to generate forms of authority. These forms can be read
through jurisdiction, technologies of space-making, temporality, movement; and through
narrative forms. The literature shows extractivism to be deeply linked to racialized, colonial
and capitalist forms of violence. Sites including water are used to shore up extraction also on
land, and forms of settler or imperial authority produce unstable narratives. The methods I
used in this thesis are an attention to history, in order to negate narratives of linear progress,
and technologies to examine how extraction may be authorized in situations where there are
less obvious claims to justify it. Specifically, the work of techniques of space-making relying
on imperial imaginaries, constructing a linear, homogenous temporality, and techniques of
control and asserting ownership through movement and division. Returning to a set of
debates over the Antarctic Treaty System at the General Assembly in late 1984, I have
suggested that Antarctica is also constructed as an imaginary and utilized to legitimize claims
to sovereignty via discovery as well as to (attempt to) control emerging discourses about the
common heritage of mankind and limit its potential. I also argued that focusing on the Treaty
System’s effects in a spatially confined way cannot fully appreciate how it reinforces
international law as a mechanism that locates the power to decide, extract and profit in the
global North. In this way, the imaginary of Antarctica is used to naturalize colonial binaries
and concepts that work to legitimize extractivism by signatory Northern states in the global
South, as well as their own authority in what is for some states the contested territory of a
settler colony. I suggested that spatial and temporal registers allow the relationship between
extractivism and authority to be read more clearly. Linear temporality works to legitimize
discovery as a way to claim authority. Spatially, the construction of Antarctica as a continent
of environmentalism relied on and legitimizes extractivism through contributing to imperial
geographies. Imperial spatial imaginaries and linear, homogenized temporalities work
together to reassert imperial ordering that is deeply entangled with global extractivism. In this
way, the international ordering visible in signatory states discourse can also be read as
reinforcing imperiality and claims to authority beyond Antarctic territory, internationally and
within specific nation-states. Reading discourses of sustainable diversion measures to
regulate extraction in the Murray-Darling river system, I argued that practices that position
the rivers as moveable, divisible and exchangeable does not significantly shift the
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commodification of the river as resource that remains a key part of extractivist interventions.
I also suggested that techniques of movement are both utilized to place the state’s law and
exert control over the waters of these rivers, but also movement shows that this control
cannot be certain or complete. Partly the specific ways in which the liquidity of the waters
and remoteness of ice are used to assert territorial authority depends on the spatial
construction of extractive site’s and the positioning of resources as separable commodities,
yet extractivism and claiming authority over land are inextricably linked.567 Relatedly, my
second concern in the thesis was how states used these forms of law and their relationship to
extractivism to generate, stabilize or project authority. Examining the international ordering
that is enacted even where extractivism is not explicitly present both allows a broader
appreciation of the co-constitution between colonial authority and extraction, and a broader
set of resistive possibilities that contest this ordering. The ways that the co-constitution of
extractivism and authority can be understood in these two examples include both how legal
ordering produces extractivism and how extractivism produces legal ordering. Because of the
broader ordering involved in law’s structuring of extractivism, resistive possibilities inherent
in law’s liquidity challenge legal ordering in a number of ways, through direct opposition to
extractive projects, through challenging the imperial extractive ordering of legal narratives or
through challenging the place of the colonial state’s law. The resistive possibilities inherent
in law’s liquidity draw out both the violence and impossibility of completeness or stasis in
the authority-extractivism relationship, and multiple challenges to ordering of extraction and
authority in both material and imaginative registers show expose more than contestation or
doctrinal change, but multiple possibilities of re-ordering.
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